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ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation :

Post 9/11 Maritime Security Measures:
Global Maritime Security versus the Facilitation of
Global Maritime Trade

Degree

:

MSc

The infamy of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the World Trade Centre and
the Pentagon caused the US to re-evaluate its ‘homeland’ vulnerabilities against the
threat of terrorism that intending to carry out mass casualty attacks. Ever since the
dawn of the day, numerous initiatives have been implemented to maximise the
security of the international maritime transport. The initiatives, in particular,
highlighted the weaknesses in links among the modes of transport supply chain and
the need to coordinate security related approach among those modes.

The possibility of massive terrorist attack that would be bigger than that of Sept. 11
had been envisaged on maritime related sectors. Though speculative in nature, hours
of manpower, millions of dollars and uncountable effort had and have to be spent.
Security agenda or ‘the appearance of security’ has seemingly replaced the need to
facilitate maritime efficiency.

Security measures and facilitation aspects of shipping are two concepts apparently
opposing to each other and the relationship between these two dichotomies have
been extensively discussed. However, stakeholders worldwide have generally agreed
that a sound and practical balance between these two security and facilitation
requirements is indispensable. Security instruments that led to the improvement in
the security consciousness have been given considerable efficient effect on trade
facilitation. There is no single ‘silver bullet’ to deal with the issue of maritime

v

security effectively and efficiently. This formidable task requires deep coordination
and intense work of national agencies and international community to ensure that the
required security on the supply chain to be achieved.

This concluding chapter provides the brief outlook of maritime security measures
and holds the view that maritime security and trade efficiency are distinct yet
interrelated. The dichotomies between these two opposing concepts need to be
addressed on a priority basis. A set of suggestions for improving maritime security
without affecting efficiency of maritime trade is also highlighted.

KEYWORDS:

Maritime security, Facilitation, MTSA, C-TPAT, ISPS Code,
SUA Convention.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

“We are all determined to fight terrorism and to do our utmost to banish
it from the face of the earth, but the force we use to fight it should always be
proportional and focused on the actual terrorists. We cannot and must not
fight them by using their own method – by inflicting indiscriminate violence
and terror on innocent civilians including children”
-

Kofi Annan,

Secretary General of the UN

1.1

Maritime challenges after 9/11

On August 2, 1939, Albert Einstein wrote a letter to President Franklin Roosevelt.
The aim of the letter, among others, was to inform the President on his speculation
that “a single bomb, carried by boat and exploded in port, might very well destroy
the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory”1. Sixty-seven years
of age, Einstein’s prophecy is now a security nightmare and most importantly, the
infamous Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the World Trade Centre and the
Pentagon had caused the US to re-evaluate its ‘homeland’ vulnerabilities against the
threat of terrorism that intends to carry out mass casualty attacks. The nature of the
attacks and scale of destruction surpassed any terrorist attacks ever experienced by
the international community in general and specifically in the US. The attacks have
been a catalyst on the widespread international recognition by the global community

1

Daly, J. C. K., “al-Qaeda and Maritime Terrorism (Part I)” – In Terrorism Monitor, vol. I, issue 4,
October 24, 2003, Washington D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, p. 1.
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that something has to be done to prevent transnational terrorists from infiltrating the
legitimate global network of international transport in general.

Ever since the dawn of the day, apart from fighting the war in Afghanistan and
tightening the security of the border and airline industry, the US has also
implemented numerous other unilateral initiatives, such as the 24-Hour Rule and
entering into various other bilateral agreements, for instance the CSI and C-TPAT to
maximise the security of the sector it deemed highly at risk of the threat of terrorism;
international maritime transport. The initiatives in particular highlighted the
weaknesses in links among the modes of transport supply chain and the need to
coordinate security related approach among those modes. These measures are
designed and built on an existing security framework for other modes of transport,
predominantly from the airline security framework, established over many years.

In addition, the US has also dragged the international maritime community most
importantly the IMO to work together in its war against terror. Most important of
those are the 2002 amendment to SOLAS 74 and the recently concluded amendment
to SUA 1988. No objection given, the invocation of indispensable security interests
in the implementation of measures and other regulations that may indirectly shape
international transactions commercially in order to achieve a single national security
overriding goal; reduction of the risks of terrorist attacks.

1.2

Vulnerabilities of maritime trade

International maritime services consist of three types of activities; international
maritime transport (freight and passenger), maritime auxiliary service and port
service. All these network of activities are vulnerable to the threat of terrorism. There
are a number of reasons that these activities become so susceptible to the threat of
terrorism. Firstly, due to its sheer volume of cargo, its overriding focusing on speed
and efficiency, as well as its international nature where ships sail in a ‘largely lawless

2

frontier’2. All these factors being put together contributed greatly to the vulnerability
of the maritime trade against the possibility of terrorist targeting the whole maritime
transport system or using it to pursue their nefarious and wicked intentions. The
vulnerabilities of maritime industries against numerous security risks is often
characterised by a much dreaded consequences for example in terms of loss of lives,
damage to physical property and installation, immense financial lost and huge
liabilities.

1.3

Maritime security initiatives – a brief outlook

Intending to protect its homeland and interests against terrorism, the US has
implemented series of unilateral anti-terrorist measures. Even though most of the
initiatives are unilateral and “hastily introduced”, it was with worldwide application.
Being the largest trading nations with the share amounting almost 20 percent of the
total world trade, such initiatives have had immense impact on every aspect of global
maritime trade. Those measures were seen to be inhibiting the growth of
international maritime trade where those measures have forced the maritime trade
related industry to rethink and reappraise its practices and way of doing business.

The possibility of massive terrorist attack that would be bigger than those of Sept. 11
had been envisaged on maritime related sectors. Though speculative in nature, hours
of manpower, millions of dollars and uncountable effort needed and had to be spent.
As a result, industry while trying to refute the need for too much anti-terrorist
measures, were unable to impose anything substantial towards the government which
act under the notion of national security. In maritime security, security agenda, or
‘the appearance of security’ has seemingly replaced the need to facilitate maritime
efficiency.

2

Ibid Daly, p. 3.
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1.4

Costs of security to the maritime industry

For the shipping industry, the need to confront terrorism directly has brought with it
the clear requirement for a careful analysis of security risk, almost regardless of the
trading area of any particular vessel. North American waters where very real fears
about the possibility of attacks on strategic targets such as oil, gas and passenger
shipping, nuclear power station and the ports themselves has led to high level of
alertness and the close control and scrutiny of shipping movements. The need for
security inspections and monitoring have occasioned delays and increased costs. One
major difficulty in building appropriate security regimes is engaging the active
involvement of the developing world. Sidelining or employing the developing world
in the quest of securing global maritime trade would both have its own repercussions.
Marginally treating the developing world would cause their economies to lag behind
thus creating new gaps for terrorists to inject the malicious idea.

1.5

The purpose of the dissertation

The purpose of this dissertation is to identify and examine major global and US
maritime security initiatives introduced after the Sept 11 attack against the US. It will
focus on the initiatives that have serious implications on the facilitation of
international maritime trade. To do so, the topic would be incomplete unless the
conventions related to facilitation of maritime trade are analysed. Further, this
dissertation would try to identify the tensions and synergy between the need to
facilitate trade and the need for security of shipping. Finally the dissertation will
make proposals and recommendations in order to reach an acceptable level of
uniformity, regarding the initiatives and to balance those security initiatives with
trade facilitation.

4

CHAPTER 2

THE THREAT OF TERRORISM IN THE MARITIME TRADE
: IS IT REAL?

“The events of 11 September 2001, and a plethora of other incidents all
over the world since, have demonstrated the determination of terrorists, in
addition to pursuing their political aims, to disrupt our society. One of the
lessons that these events have brought home to us all is the vulnerability of
transport networks and the potential they hold to be either the targets or the
instruments of terror. The shipping industry is, unfortunately, no exception”

-

Efthimios Mitropoulos,

Secretary General of the IMO

2.1

The vulnerability of the maritime supply chain

International maritime services consist of three types of activities; international
maritime transport (freight and passenger), maritime auxiliary service and port
service3. These three activities led to the necessity to draw out rules and regulations
to govern them and eventually after the 9/11, the need to secure them became more
and more imperative and has been embraced into the main agenda of the
international maritime community. In order to deal with the diverse regulations
regarding security in shipping, it is pertinent to focus on the very distinct yet
undoubtedly related factors of the risks affecting the following elements:
3

Fink C., Mattoo A. and Neagu I. C., “Trade in International Maritime Transport: How Much Does
Policy Matter? – In World Bank Economic Review, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 81 – 108. Available online at:
<http://wber.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/16/1/81?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFOR
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(a)

Cargo,

(b)

Vessels themselves, and

(c)

People who work in shipping, including seafarers and companies associated
with shipping.

Broadly, these risks can be defined as the maritime part on the entire network of the
supply chain that involves flow of goods and services from the main sources to the
final consumer. This maritime part of the supply chain comprises of shipping and
ports activities. A supply chain is the linked set of resources and processes that
begins with the sourcing of raw material and extends through the delivery of end
items to the final customer. It is an effective combination and coordination of
“various channel members” including vendors, manufacturing facilities, logistics
providers, internal distribution centers, distributors, wholesalers and all other entities
that lead up to final customer acceptance4. In other words, the supply chain activities
transform raw materials and components to a finished product that is delivered to the
end customers5. It is a network6 or integration of transportation nodes that provide
the physical operation to be carried out with simple streamlined documentation,
efficient management with effective control towards fully meeting customer’s needs7.

Present information and technology boom have made the supply chain management
to recognize neither national boundaries nor distances. Taking advantage of the
efficiency and cost effectiveness of supply chain today, product manufacturers obtain
cheaper and abundant raw materials from sources outside their national boundaries
MAT=&fulltext=trade+in+international+maritime+service&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&volume=
16&issue=1&resourcetype=HWCIT> (Accessed on 20 July 2006)
4
Xu K., Dong Y., Evers P. T., “Towards Better Coordination of the Supply Chain” – In
Transportation Research, Part E, vol. 31, no. 1, March 2001, pp 35-54. Elsevier Science Ltd. (2000).
5
Chopra S., Meindl P., Supply Chain Management: Strategy, Planning and Operation, pp. 3-4. New
Jersey: Prentice Hall (2001). See also <http://en.wikipedia.org/Wiki/Supply_chain> (Accessed on 30
June 2006)
6
Christopher M., Logistics and Supply Chain Management: Strategies for Reducing Cost and
Improving Service, 2nd ed., Edinburg: Pearson Education Ltd. (2004), p. 15.
7
Banomyong R., “The Impact of Port and Trade Security Initiatives on Maritime Supply-Chain
Management” – In Maritime Policy and Management, Vol. 32, No. 1, 3 – 13, January – March 2005,
London 2005. p.3. Routledge Taylor and Francis Group.
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and export their finished products to users in totally different countries. Almost all
international trade in goods is transported by sea, and ocean shipping inevitably plays
the central focal role in world trade and thus contributes to world economic growth.
For this reason, it is not a mere exaggeration to say that almost all goods that we had
used, are now using, or will be using, are at some time in their manufacturing or
distribution pass through the maritime leg of the supply chain8.

Briefly, a supply chain in the international trade started initially with the shipper or
the source, usually a manufacturer. The originator or manufacturer is relying on a
number of third party logistics providers to deliver its product to the final
user/consumer9. It then either be transported to the port or consolidated with other
cargos depending on the nature and volume of the manufacturer’s cargo. This stage
may see the involvement of a number of logistics players, including buying agents,
freight forwarders, customs brokers, carriers and warehouse agents. At the port, the
cargo after that is loaded onto the ship that will deliver it to the destination port.
Thereafter, the cargo is passing through another set of third party logistics providers,
before finally reaching the end user10.

But in reality, the supply chains in international maritime trade in particular are far
more complex and multifaceted. Cargo (physical) and information flow
simultaneously and endlessly 11 . The so-called ‘complex web of electronic data
interchange’ now progressively more and more dominates what were once done
through paper documentation. Adding the headache to this intricacy is the reality that
supply chains for various goods differ. A simple shipping container on a distinctive
door-to-door journey will be handled at as many as twelve to fifteen different
8

An Assessment of Maritime Technology and Trade (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, Office of
Technology
Assessment,
October
1983),
pg.
9
retrieved
from:
<http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/disk3/1983/8302/8302/PDF> (Accessed on 30 June 2006)
9
Simchi-Levi D., Kaminsky P., Simchi-Levi E., Managing the Supply Chain: the Definitive Guide for
the Business Professional, New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing (2004), p. 21.
10
Shah S. B., Securing Maritime Trade: Post 9/11 Maritime Security Initiatives and their Implication
on Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, pg. 3, available online at
<http://www.mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/papers/online.html> (Accessed on 30 January 2006).
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physical locations which include, for example, warehouses and ports, use a range of
transportation modes, engage about twenty-five different parties interface and
produce some thirty to forty papers 12 . It is standard for cargo to pass through
transshipment ports, where it will be unloaded and loaded on another ship. Therefore,
a single cargo container may pass through more than two different ports and be
carried by more than a vessel, in addition to the other hinterland locations and
supplementary land transport modes, which can either, be trucks or trains13.

Despite this intricate contact of people and documents, and the perpendicular volume
of goods that flow through it, the global supply chain, benefiting from the revolution
in information technology aided by advances in transportation and logistics, is highly
efficient and undoubtedly inexpensive. Looking at the supply chain on this basis, the
maritime support system, i.e. the ports and the ocean going ships, is the most alluring
target in the whole global supply chain, because that is where it is most vulnerable
and carries the most strategic significance. Prior to 9/11, with regard to the question
of security, it was entirely paying attention at addressing the problem of cargo theft
and protection of proprietary data from antagonism14. Protecting the supply chain
from being targeted or abused by terrorists is traditionally not a main concern. It
never took any precedence over traditional security concerns.

“As worldwide commerce grows at an unprecedented rate, so do the risks posed by
terrorism”15. Terrorists seek out weaknesses and vulnerabilities that can be exploited;
those targets with the combination of vulnerability to attack, psychological and
political significance and which, if attacked, poses the least risk to the terrorists. The
financial cost and economic disruption caused by an attack on the maritime leg of the
11

Ibid Banomyong, p. 4.
The Economist, When Trade and Security Clash, April 6th, 2002, pp. 66-67.
13
Van de Voort M. & Rahman A., “Securing Global Supply Chains” – In Port Technology
International, 24th ed., winter 2004, London: Henley Media Group Ltd, p. 67.
14
Spear A.F., “Defensive Logistic” – In Containerization International, Issue 13, Vol. 37, August
2004, p. 48. London: T & F Informa UK Ltd. (2004).
15
Latham D. & Toddington M., “Who are the International Association of Airport & Seaport Police”
– In Port Technology International, 30th ed., summer 2006, London: Henley Media Group, p. 169.
12
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supply chain is another reason why terrorists may deem it an attractive target16. This
is borne out by a study done by the Brookings Institution, an independent US-based
public policy research institution. The study assessed the costs of an attack on the
supply chain, in the form of weapons of mass destruction placed in shipping
containers would be ten times higher than the costs of 9/11. The summary of the
study is depicted in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Economic Disruption Resulting from Terrorism

Nature of attacks

Nature of economic disruption

Potential Costs
(USD)

Weapons of mass destruction

Extended shutdown in deliveries;

shipped via containers, mail

physical destruction and lost

Up to $1 trillion

production in contaminated area;
massive loss of life; medical
treatment for survivors
Efficient release of

Disruption to economic activity in

biological agent through

affected area; threat to confidence

much of a major urban area

and economic operations in other

$750 billion

areas; massive loss of life; medical
expenses
Widespread terror against

Significant and sustained decline in

key elements of public

economy activity in public spaces;

economy across nation

associated drop in consumer

(malls, restaurants, movie

confidence

$250 billion

theaters, etc)
Large attacks that expose a

Substantial but temporary weakening

finite and reparable

of economy due to direct (loss of

vulnerability (like 9/11)

human life and physical capital) and

$100 billion

indirect effects (decline in confidence
and network failures)
16

Flynn, S. E., “Beyond Border Control” – In Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, no. 6, November-December
2000, p. 62
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Nature of attacks

Nature of economic disruption

Potential Costs
(USD)

Cyber attack on computer

Regional electricity shortages that

systems regulating regional

persists for a week; health risks from

electric power; combined

heat/cold; interruptions of production

with physical attacks on

schedules; destruction of physical

transmission and distribution

capital

$25 billion

network
Bombing or bomb scares

Effective shutting down of several

$10 billion

major cities for a day
Source: Brookings Institution 17

Another study in the form of port security war game was also conducted a year after
the attack of 9/11. The study took place on 2-3 October 2002 and carried out by the
US consulting firm, Booz Allen Hamilton. It aimed to show in detail the repercussion
of similar attack of 9/11 against the supply chain. The study involved the active
participation of 85 senior policymakers from the Department of Transportation, US
Customs18, USCG, Department of Defense, Transportation Security Administration,
Office of Homeland Security, intelligence agencies, port authorities, and various
other government entities with business participants, including CEOs and senior
executive from transportation carriers, technology firms, industry associations, and
supply chain representatives of automobile and food/beverage manufacturers and
distributors with critical stakes in port security. The participants were made to
respond to a mock crisis the way they would have to handle in real life should an
attack comparable to 9/11 occurred. The scenario began with the accidental
17

The attacks postulated in this table and even their relative rankings, are illustrative and speculative.
In addition to other economic costs, the estimates above assume an economic value for human life in
the range proposed in Richard Layard and Stephen Glaister, Cost-Benefit Analysis (Cambridge
University Press, 1994). Further reading, see
<http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/homeland/chapter1.pdf> (Accessed on 20 August 2006)
18
On March 1, 2003, US Customs Service along with the Inspections Programme on the Immigration
and Naturalization (INS) and the Border Patrol of the INS combined to form the Customs and Border
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discovery of a radiological bomb in a container on a truck as it left the port of Los
Angeles. It escalated with the detention of suspected terrorists at the port of
Savannah. Over a simulated period of three weeks, another bomb was detected in
Minneapolis, shipped through Halifax, Nova Scotia, and a third bomb exploded in
Chicago. At the end of the war game, it was estimated that the financial losses
resulting from the attacks came to about USD 58 billion19.

Back in 2003, during the second anniversary of the devastating attack of the US, the
TV network ABC aired a documentary on how 15lbs of depleted uranium shipped on
Maersk vessel from Jakarta to the port of Los Angeles, and thereafter to New York
without being detected. It has caused massive embarrassments because this is the
second time where the tight American security system was breached20. The first time
was involving the use of P&O Nedlloyd containership21.

2.1.1 Cargo-related risks

After the World War II particularly, the world economy flourished. The booming of
the world economy inevitably led to great development in the means of handling
maritime cargo. Initially, maritime cargo was moved in individual packages, and
then the system of containerization was introduced and eventually become one of the
most modern and effective means to handle maritime cargo. Initially started in mid1950 by Malcolm McLean, owner of a North Carolina trucking firm, containerization
has gained its popularity as the most effective method so far of handling the maritime
cargo22. The simplified containerization system allows goods to be moved by the
Protection Agency (CBP). With the passage of the Homeland Security Act 2002, the CBP passed from
the jurisdiction of the Treasury Department to the Department of Homeland Security.
19
Details of the study can be viewed at the compilation by Mark Gerencser, Jim Weinberg, Don
Vincent in their “Port Security War Game: Implications for U.S. Supply Chain”, available online at
<http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/128648.pdf> (Accessed on 24 March 2006)
20
DHS officials and industry executives argued that they did not detect the depleted uranium – which
is harmless and legal to import into the U.S. – exactly because it was not the enriched uranium they
would have been looking for.
21
McLaughlin J., “Highlighting the security dilemma” – In BIMCO Review 2004, p. 24.
22
World Port Development, April 2006, Vol. 6 No. 4, England: MCI Media Ltd, 2006, pg. 3.
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entire trailer and therefore much more effectively and safely. Consequently, port fees
were reduced due to lesser times spent in port and eventually shorter turnaround time
for ships. As of today, the vast majority, almost 90%, of world’s non-bulk cargo is
transported in container ships. Indeed containerization has revolutionized cargo
shipment today. In 2005, it is reported that some 18 million total containers were in
circulation in the world’s ocean making over 200 million trips per year 23 . As of
August 1, 2005, total contracts of new containership reached 1,110 vessels,
producing an overall slot capacity of 4.28M TEU24. This shows to some degree that
containerization will continue to gain popularity.

However, the efficiency and effectiveness of the containerization system with its
staggering volume of container ‘boxes’ seemingly poses the massive challenges from
a maritime security point of view. As mentioned earlier, the maritime trade supply
chain involved approximately dozens of actors, piles of documents, use two or three
different modes and be handled at almost fifteen different locations physically.
Around 5.88 billion tons of goods were carried via the world’s oceans in 2002,
accounting for over 80% of world trade by volume25. Because of the sheer volume of
cargo and the need for smooth flow of trade, the focus of the maritime transport
system has always been on the speed and efficiency of cargo movement, foregoing to
a certain degree other concerns, such as crew welfare and security matters.

Cargos generally fall into two categories, bulk cargos and container cargos. Bulk
cargos can be further classified into two categories, tanker cargos and dry bulk.
Containerized cargos – cargos carried in sealed metal containers – are perceived to
carry the greatest terrorism-related risks. The total number of inspections on
containers is very small; in the US for example, before 9/11, only 2% of all incoming
23

Gerald Malia, 50 years of container shipping. Presentation delivered at the Sheldon Kinney
Memorial Lecture, World Maritime University, Malmö, Sweden, dated 31 May 2006.
24
Roach J., “World Fleet Changes in July 2005” – In Containerization International, Issue 9, Vol. 38,
September 2005, London: T & F Informa UK Ltd., 2005.
25
OECD Report, Maritime Transport Committee, Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and
Economic Impact, July 2003, p. 6, available online at
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containerized cargos were inspected. This is simply because of the massive number
of containers passing through the supply chain. In 2004, for instance, it was
estimated that 11 million shipping containers were in use and 1.94 billion tons of dry
cargo were transported via container26. The need for smooth flow of such enormous
amount of cargos left authorities no choice but to rely on the good faith of shippers
and the accuracy of documentation. These factors render it especially vulnerable to
being abused by terrorists.

Container cargos are usually susceptible as a terrorist target in such a way that it
faces the risk of being stolen by terrorist to be used in their actions or sold to sponsor
their activities. On the other hand, the far greater threat in relation to containers is the
risk of them being abused to facilitate and aid terrorism acts. Terrorists can place a
tiny nuclear bomb, for example, either in a container or in the cargo positioned inside
a container. This “Trojan Horse27” scenario could be done rather easily, whether by
the terrorists acting as genuine shippers or workers in the manufacturer’s premise or
consolidation centre, or by inserting it later at any of the legs of the supply chain. As
soon as the container later reaches the preplanned strategic target, which may be a
busy port or when the container is on a ship, the bomb inside the container would be
detonated. And it would be far more catastrophic if this small nuclear bomb were
detonated when it reaches or passes through a population centre. This might be
happening because containers usually do not stop and lay up at the ports. The vast
majority of containerized cargos move inland via a multi-modal network linking
vessels, port terminals, trucks and trains, which pass through various cities and other
strategic targets.

At the same juncture, terrorists to smuggle goods such as illegal weapons or to
smuggle terrorists themselves could also manipulate containers. In October 2001,

<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/61/18521672.pdf> (Accessed on 2 April 2006)
26
UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2005, Geneva: UNCTAD, p.15.
27
European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT), Container Transport Security across
Modes, Paris: OECD Publications Service, p.13.
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this concern proved well founded. Port workers at Gioia Tauro in Italy found a
suspected al-Qaeda operative in a shipping container destined for Canada on a ship
from Port Said. The container in which the suspected terrorist was found was
furnished with supplies for a long journey, a laptop computer and a toilet. The man
also had two mobile phones, cameras and numerous fake documents including a
certificate identifying him as an aircraft mechanic, airport maps and airport security
passes for Canada, Thailand and Egypt28.

Some commentators argue that bulk cargos carry greater risk compared to container
cargos. Firstly, it is because they form the bulk of maritime trade. Bulk carriers
formed 74.9% of the world fleet plying international trade. Nuclear or other
explosive devices can easily be hidden undetected in the cargos, which face less
scrutiny than containerized cargos. As a target, they are also more attractive. Oil
tankers are a particularly preferred target, as their cargos could easily be sold. Ships
carrying hazardous cargos can be hijacked and the cargos stolen29.

2.1.2 Ship-related risks

Ocean going ships are the backbones of international maritime trade where there are
more than 46,000 vessels servicing the international trade. Ocean-going ships will
always remain attractive either as targets of terrorism malice or as instruments to
facilitate acts of terrorism. There are numerous terrorist threats against the ship itself.
Terrorists can detonate tampered cargos, placed earlier on the ship, or board the ship
before blowing it up. Ships could be targeted to a direct attack, like what happened
on October 6, 2002, when terrorists in a small fishing boat packed with explosives
rammed and badly damaged the 300,000dwt French VLCC, MV Limburg as it
slowed for pilotage service three miles off the Mina al-Dibbah of the coast of

28
29

Ibid The Economist, p. 65.
Ibid OECD, p. 10.
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Yemen30. Although the attack did not cause massive human losses (only one person
was killed) nor did it cripple the global maritime trade, it did achieve some notable
successes, among others, it gained global notoriety, and received tremendous media
and other coverage until today and secondly and most importantly, it hurt the
domestic economy of Yemen, the country in which the attack took place. A month
after the attack, insurance underwriters imposed a 300% increase in insurance
premiums on all vessels coming into Yemeni ports31. This translated to an average
cost of an additional USD 150,000 for each vessel entering Yemeni ports. These
resulted in a decrease of 50% of port activities in Yemeni ports, losing the country
approximately USD 3.8 million per month.

On the other matters, the ship might also create some degree of risks to being used to
facilitate terrorism32. This at present receiving the furthermost consideration is the
likelihood of ships being used as weapons to target strategic facilities. This prospect
is given due consideration because the fear that the said to be terrorists would
assimilate the attack of 9/11 where the airplanes were hijacked and used to hit
strategic places; i.e. World Trade Center and Pentagon. This fear has been given
coverage especially by the Singaporeans, who fear that a ship carrying WMD could
enter Singapore ports and the weapons detonated. Terrorists do not necessarily have
to source for the hard-to-obtain WMD to achieve their nefarious objectives. As
simple as a vessel carrying large amount of ammonium nitrate, an agricultural
fertilizer used throughout the world, could be hijacked and the cargo rigged to
explode when the ship enters busy ports33.

30

The Sea, Issue 161, Jan-Feb 2003, p. 8. Following the attack, a number of Gulf States tighten their
security and institute new protective measures. Singapore’s navy has also stepped up its policy of
random escorts for ‘high value merchant vessels’ through the Singapore straits. These ships include
liquefied gas carriers, crude tankers and cruise ships.
31
The Joint War Committee (JWC) of Lloyd’s Market Association concluded that the area was a
terrorist target and declared the increase of war risk premium. For further reading, see Raymond C. Z.,
“The Threat of Maritime Terrorism in the Malacca Straits” – In Terrorism Monitor, Vol. IV, Issue 3,
February 9, 2006, pg. 8.
32
Murphy M., “Maritime terrorism: the threat in context” – In Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1,
2006, pg. 2.
33
Ibid OECD, p. 10.
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In late 2001, this sort of fear is not at all far-fetched when Singapore cracked down
on the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network. It was ascertained that JI had made plans for
suicide attacks on US warships visiting Singapore. It was also discovered that
Singapore JI members had already taken steps to procure 17 tonnes of ammonium
nitrate for the manufacture of truck bombs to attack US, Israeli and British interests
in Singapore. The rail incident on 18 February 2004 in Khorasan, Iran, that involved
explosion of ammonium nitrate showed how bad the damage can be. The blast was
so powerful that Iranian seismologists recorded a quake of magnitude 3.6 on the
Richter scale at the time of the explosion34. An explosion of a shipload of the same
material, engineered to deliver the maximum damage in a location like the port of
Singapore, would create devastation equal to that of 9/11.
The 9/11 attacks proved that the unimaginable can happen35 . Terrorists may also
hijack ships for other purposes, for example, to blow it up and sink it at chokepoints
such as the Straits of Malacca thereby causing a maritime traffic jam and
unprecedented environmental damage, or to steal cargos, especially dangerous and
hard-to-obtain cargos. Some kinds of cargo carried by ocean going ships such as
weapons and dangerous chemicals are at high risk of being hijacked. For example, it
was reported that due to renewed concern about terrorist attacks, the Panama
authorities had beefed up security to protect a British ship carrying radioactive cargo
from Japan to France via Panama Canal36.

34

The accident that occurred in the village of Khayyam, Vishapur (Khorosan) Iran created a death toll
of over 300 people and 460 others injured and four villages destroyed due to the blasts. Further
reading: <http://en.wikipedia/Nishapur_train_disaster> (Accessed on 28 March 2006)
35
Van der Jagt N., “European Shipping Council” – In Containerization International, June 2002,
London: T & F Informa UK Ltd., 2002, pg. 37.
36
Becker E., “Panama steps up security for ships with atomic wastes” – In New York Times, January
15, 2000.
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Ships could also aid terrorist activities by deliberately or inadvertently transporting
arms or even terrorist operatives37. This is a regular Palestinian practice in the IsraelPalestinian conflict, as shown by three interceptions by Israeli forces of three armscarrying ships in the period beginning May 2001 to May 2003. Another important
point to note is that terrorists need not even have to hijack commercial ships to carry
out their activities. According to some Western intelligence agencies pointed out that
Al-Qaeda is said to own a fleet of 15 commercial ships. These ships could then be
used to carry out the activities outlined above38. This is made much simpler and
easier by ship registration provisions in various ship registers, which allow beneficial
owners to mask or hide their true identities39. An OECD study found that it is very
easy, and comparatively cheap, to establish a complex web of corporate entities to
provide very effective cover to the identities of beneficial owners who do not want to
be known40.

2.1.3 Port-related risks

It is not my intent to instill fear or alarm in anyone today. But the
sobering reality is, because we live in a country that prides itself on the
openness of its democracy, we always at risk of a terrorist attack.
Therefore, it is important that we address the issue of security and crime
in seaports now41.

37

Timlen T., “The Broadening Scope of Maritime Security” – In BIMCO Review 2005, Denmark:
Book Production Consultant plc, p. 182.
38
Abuza Z., “Terrorism in the Southeast Asia: Keeping al-Qaeda at Bay” – in Terrorism Monitor, vol.
II, no. 9, 6 May 2004, p. 4. Available online at
<http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=236669> (Accessed on 17 August
2006)
39
Herbert-Burns R., “Terrorism in the Early 21st Century Maritime Domain” – in The Best of Times,
the Worst of Times: Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific, Ho J. and Raymond C. Z., (eds), Singapore:
World Scientific Printers, 2005, pp. 160-161.
40
Ibid OECD, p. 4.
41
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The statement above by Admiral James M. Loy, the former head of USCG on his
statement on 24 July 2001 before the Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation of the U.S. Senate indicated that there is security threats existed in
ports. The statement made just a few months before the 9/11 attacks had raised some
eyebrows even the 9/11 attacks did not specifically target any maritime interests42.

Inevitably, ports are the centers of the global supply chain with almost 4,000 ports
servicing the international trade. Ports play a pivotal role in facilitating global
commerce43. UNCTAD estimated that container throughput in top 20 world’s leading
port that handle containers reached 166.62 TEUs44 in 200445. Of these cargos, most
pass through the major ports. As ports become bigger and busier, they become more
vulnerable. A large port normally employs thousands of employees, and receives
hundreds of outside visitors both from land and sea. A large port also sees the entry
and exit of hundreds of land vehicles and a large number of ships and other vessels
daily. The 9/11 Commission in their report stated that, “While commercial aviation
remains a possible target, terrorists may turn their attention to other modes.
Opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime and surface
transportation”46.

Tens or even hundreds of thousands tones of cargo, in various forms, pass through it
daily. The US for example, its maritime system includes more than 300 ports with

42

Kirchner A., “Maritime Security: Consequences for the Maritime Transport Industry” – In Ocean
Yearbook 19, Chircop A. and McConnell M. L. (eds.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, spring
2005, p. 299.
43
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Ibid UNCTAD, pg. 73.
46
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more than 3700 terminals spreading along thousands of miles of coastline 47 .
Unavoidably, it also normally houses key strategic facilities such as LNG depot or
bunkers and warehouses storing hazardous cargo. The LNG for instance, is
extremely important for the US where it fulfilled ten percent of US energy needs.
With docking facilities costing more than USD1 billion, any terrorist attack would
cripple the US economy in the extreme. As such, LNG imports bound for U.S.
require USCG escort vessels while 200 nautical miles at sea 48 . Ports represent a
bottleneck of each nation’s lifeline49; as such it carries a high risk of becoming a
target for terrorist, or of being used by terrorists as an entry or exit point for
smuggling arms, weapons of mass destruction, terrorist operatives and other
materials.

2.1.4 Workers/seafarers –related risks

Millions of workers are employed by businesses involved in the global maritime
trade. A single port involved in international trade, for example, normally employs
thousands of employees and receives a large number of incoming visitors every
single day, any one of which may be a terrorist intent on causing harm. Of the many
maritime workers, seafarers have received the most attention after 9/11. Seafarers
were traditionally treated in a special way. Prior to 9/11, seafarers arriving on board a
merchant ship can go ashore and mingle with the local population without much
entry restriction. Visas and other form of immigration documents are not normally
required. In 2005, the worldwide supply of seafarers was estimated at 466,000
officers and 721,000 ratings50. The Philippines supplies the most number of seafarers
(230,000 in 2000), followed by Indonesia (83,500), China (82,000) and Turkey
(62,500). Of these top four countries, the Philippines, Indonesia and Turkey have all
47
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48
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faced terrorist attacks post 9/11 and are known to have active Al-Qaeda affiliated
cells. It is not far-fetched therefore to imagine that these terrorists may pose as
seafarers, or convert genuine seafarers to their cause either to sabotage any part of
the maritime trade or to use the maritime trade to facilitate their activities.

This threat is exacerbated by the problem of maritime certificate fraud. Demand for
seafaring job exceeds supply and regulation of recruitment as well as lax manning
practices have opened the floodgates for corruption and fraud. In a study carried out
by the SIRC51, it was found that in 10 out of 13 countries visited by the researchers,
there was evidence of fraudulent practices in the certificates and the certification
process reported in 200152. This would mean that many seafarers currently working
as crew on board ships obtained their certificates fraudulently. A few reasons were
identified as to the motivation for seafarers to obtain fraudulent documents and one
of them is for the pursuance of committing crimes, which involve maritime
transport 53 . If they can obtain fraudulent certificate enabling them to become
seafarers, what can stop terrorists, with far dangerous motives, from doing so
themselves.

2.2

Terrorism-related risks along the supply chain

Having examined the threat of terrorism that is persistent in the global maritime
supply chain, it is timely to scrutinize the two aspects of terrorism-related risks as to
the major elements of the supply chain discussed in this section. The first is the risk
of the elements becoming targets of terrorism. The second is the risk of the elements
being abused to facilitate terrorism. In this regard the supply chain, which involve
different actors from the manufacturers; i.e. source of goods to third party logistics or
50

Institute for Employment Research, BIMCO/ISF Manpower 2005 Update. Coventry: Team
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52
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the so-called agents. In this stage there are few terrorism related risks in the sense
that the terrorists posing as manufacturers/workers can prepare lethal cargo/insert
lethal material into cargo esp. containers to be activated later; or insert terrorismrelated materials/personnel into cargo esp. containers to be smuggled into destination
country and also the terrorists can steal cargos.

While on the way to the port of origin, the terrorists can threaten the supply chain in
several different manners: for instance, as following:(a)

(b)

Threats from sea including:(i)

Attack on port facilities/ships in port by small vessels

(ii)

Ships rammed into port facilities/other ships

Threats from land including:(i)

Ships/cargo detonated to cause maximum damage to port

(ii)

Attack/sabotage

by

terrorists

posing

as

workers/ship

crew/contractors
(c)

Terrorists
(i)

insert terrorism-related materials/personnel into regular cargo
especially containers to be activated later/smuggled into destination
country

(ii)

slips into ships at berth

(iii)

tamper with ships at berth

(iv)

steal hazardous cargo stored at port

In the same juncture, terrorism-related risks may also present on the ships or the
ships itself is the risk in manners described as tampered cargo exploded aboard
ship/explosive material installed earlier on ship exploded, attack from other vessels,
terrorists hijack ships or terrorists posing as crew take over ship to destroy ship/steal
cargo/using ship as weapon, ship knowingly/unknowingly transport terrorism-related
materials, or in the worst case scenario, terrorists owned ship that carries out
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legitimate business to finance terrorism or attacks other ships/port facilities etc. or
used as weapon e.g. to ram another ships, sunk at choke points, as floating bomb.

When reaching the destination port, the risks would similarly or almost as
catastrophic as what could occur in the port of origin stipulated earlier. After
reaching the final point of destination in the supply chain, the risks of terrorism are
still persistent in the sense that explosives placed earlier in cargo placed could be
activated when it reaches its strategic target/population centre or, in the case where
terrorists being transported together with the other cargo, terrorist operatives join the
population and set their plans in motion54.

54
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CHAPTER 3
POST 9/11 MARITIME SECURITY INITIATIVES

“I never dreamed that the United States of America could be attacked. And
in that we got attacked, I vowed then, like I'm vowing to you today, that I
understand my most important priority. My most important job is to protect the
security of the American people. The threat to the United States is forefront in
my mind. I knew that at times people would say, you know, it may be an
isolated incident; let's just don't worry about it. Well, for me it's not an isolated
incident. I understand there is still an enemy which lurks out there”
-

George W. Bush,

President of the United States

3.1

Introduction

Having described in detail the nature of risks related to terrorism, it is pertinent to
now direct our focus on the initiatives that have been introduced so far in order to
manage such risks. Traditionally and known to almost everybody in the shipping
industries, the risks related to terrorist attacks on shipping have always existed and
will always exist vis-à-vis maritime trade. However, as there has never been any
significant incident demanding greater attention on security issues, the international
community has learnt to live with the risks and adopted a series of initiatives to
minimise those risks. In so far as security is concerned, it has always focused on
addressing traditional problems such as cargo theft, cargo fraud, piracy and armed
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robbery and drug smuggling. Losses through theft of cargo alone, for instance, cost
insurance companies billions of dollars annually55.

The devastating 9/11 terrorist attacks against the US have completely altered this
complacent mindset and the global community has attempted to seriously address
terrorism-related risks. Since the day of the attack, the US has been adopting the
“two-pronged approach” to garner international support in its war on terror. Firstly,
the US worked closely with relevant international organizations such as the UN
(specifically the UNSC) and the IMO in order to take action that requires member
states to impose new measures to deal with the threat of terrorism56. Secondly, the
US has been particularly active in coming up with initiatives to secure its maritime
trade, especially in relation to goods entering the country, bilaterally or through the
establishment of the “coalition of the willing”57. While some of the measures carry
minimal impacts on the rest of the international community, quite a significant
number do have considerable impacts on those involved in international maritime
trade, both technically and financially as the US is the largest trading nation holding
approximately 30% of world trade58. Although many countries and stakeholders in
the industry were against a number of these measures, arguing that they were
unilateral and hastily introduced, the significance of trade with major economies
such as the US has forced every player in the global maritime trade into a delicate
balancing act between the need for security and the smooth flow of international
trade.
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At the same time, IMO and other international organizations such as the WCO59 and
the G860 too have been active and adopted new security standards vis-à-vis ships and
ports that are involved in the international trade61. Due to resource limitation, this
chapter of the paper will only look at the major security initiatives implemented in
particular by the US and the IMO and discuss briefly some issues associated with
these measures. It is worth noting that this chapter will be addressing the maritime
security initiatives in the light of the risks enumerated earlier in Chapter 2.

A diagram as below can best depict major US and international maritime security
initiatives post 9-11:

Diagram 1: Maritime Security Initiative Post 9/11

CargoRelated Risks

Ship-Related
Risks

• C-TPAT
• CSI
• MTSA 2002
• 24-Hour Rule

• ISPS Code
• PSI
• MTSA 2002
• Protocol to SUA
Convention
2005
• 96-Hour
Advance
Notification of
Arrival

Port-Related
Risks
• ISPS Code
• MTSA 2002

Worker/Seafarers
-Related Risks
• Abolition of crew list visa and
individual visa requirement
• Detain on Board and Guard
Service Orders
• International Seafarer
Identification Card (ILO)
• 96-Hour Advance Notification
of Arrival
• National Security Entry-Exit
Registration System

Source: Shah S. B.62
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3.2

Maritime security initiatives before 9/11 – a brief outlook

Before looking in details on the various security measures being introduced after the
9/11 catastrophic attack against the US, it is of great importance that we focus our
attention on what maritime security initiatives were essentially in place (and in force)
prior to the attack.

There were, in fact, a series of attempts by the international community to address
and improve the security related matters in international shipping. Those attempts
range from different approaches taking into consideration the relevant security risks:
i.e. ports, vessels, seafarers and cargo. Over the years, a series of regional and
international instruments were adopted in international attempts to address the
suppression and prevention the threats of security against shipping as a whole. The
international community were still striving to find a balance to arrive at practical
solutions so that the measures introduced would not hamper the flow of legitimate
trade, which eventually would lead to slowing of international economic growth.
Most of the instruments introduced were either trying to put the act to terrorism at
sea63 within the scope of piracy or focusing to deal with the problem on a case-bycase basis. These were principally inadequate in respect to combat terrorism64. It
should also be noted that the two phenomena; piracy and maritime terrorism, are not
interchangeable. Both in general notably have different motives where piracy is
committed due to financial or private gains and terrorism (maritime or otherwise)
was politically driven65.
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Among the very first attempt to address the prevention of maritime security related
threats is the Geneva Convention66 and UNCLOS67. In both Geneva Convention and
UNCLOS, the notion of maritime terrorism as it is today cannot be fitted within the
legal meaning of the violence at sea: i.e. what constitutes piracy covered in both
conventions. The Geneva Convention, for instance, incorporated Articles 14 to 19
relating to piracy as it is “hostes humani generis” or “jure gentium” and “punishable
wherever encountered”68, whereas the UNCLOS reproduces the same regime in its
Articles 100 to 10769. These two conventions establish four criteria for an act to be
considered as piracy: i.e. a privately motivated (“animo furandi”) illegal act of
violence and not part of a struggle for political power70, detention or depredation
committed by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft against another
vessel, i.e. two ships requirements71 on the high seas72. These four strict requirements
had the effect that an offence occurring from within a vessel and an act that is
politically motivated would be excluded from the conception of violence at sea as
described in both conventions 73 . In order to address those lacunae, which
compromised the safety and integrity of merchant shipping 74 , the government of
Egypt, Austria and Italy proposed the creation of a new convention. The convention
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was proposed in IMO, as maritime security is also an integral part of IMO
responsibilities75. This convention was drafted in response to the hijacking of the
cruise vessel Achille Lauro76. As a result, the SUA 198877 was adopted in 10 March
1988 in Rome78. The SUA 198879 seeks to improve the existing restricted rules with
regards to piracy such as the “private ends” and “two ship requirements80”.

The main purpose of SUA 1988 is to ensure that appropriate action is taken against
persons committing unlawful acts against ships, which include the seizure of ships by
force, acts of violence against persons on board ships, and placing the devices on
board a ship which are likely to destroy and damage it81. Furthermore, Article 10 of
the said Convention obliges Contracting Governments to either extradite or prosecute
the alleged offenders. But the truth is not so, there are only a few provisions which
speaks directly toward the prevention of illegal acts of crimes at sea. If we look at the
Convention, we will find that the preamble of the Convention speaks directly on the
prevention aspects. It states that IMO as the UN body would develop measures “to
75
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prevent unlawful acts which threaten the safety of ships” and it affirms “the
desirability of monitoring rules and standards relating to the prevention and control
of unlawful acts against ships and persons on board ships, with the view of updating
them as necessary”82. Nonetheless, since the SUA Convention was created in 1988,
IMO did not actually embark into any major actions to address ship security since
IMO is more preoccupied with its traditional role of preventing marine pollution and
safety at sea.

Articles 13 and 14 respectively establish a general duty for states to prevent the use
of their national territories as bases for possible attacks and the requirements of state
to share and exchange information on terrorist attacks as well as defining the
information requirements. These pose several problems in matters of application
where: (a)

The flows of information were restricted among states that may exert
jurisdiction in accordance to SUA 1988. This is a big impediment because
shipping is an international activity where any criminal act against shipping
would have implications to third states;

(b)

The passing of information aforementioned must be based on the national
law of the state that passes the information, thus adding further to the
complications. Unless explicitly approved, most states criminalise the
passing of information to foreign powers83, creating further impediments;

(c)

Consequently, the information passed would not be timely or, in some other
worse scenario, not forthcoming at all; and
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(d)

Also, the phrase “the reason to believe that an offence set forth in Article 3
will be committed”84 creates further impediments where it is discretionary
on the passing state to transmit information based on it “reason to believe”.

Even so, like a number of other international conventions, it remains the commitment
of the signatory states to enforce it and there are a significant numbers of states
which ratified the convention without seriously accomplish anything to make it work.
It was only after 9/11 that the international community led by the US had seriously
embarked into discussion at both national and international basis on how best they
can reduce the inadequacies in the international legal systems dealing with the
terrorist threat against shipping.

Shipping and supply chain are becoming more and more complex as both involve a
wide range of parties for instance port, coastal and flag states together with shippers,
suppliers, manufacturers and the end customers. As mentioned before, shipping is an
international business involving different physical locations in multiple states as well
as different modes of transportations and a considerable number of actors. Thus, the
need for international cooperation in order to deal with this new multifaceted security
environment is high in IMO’s agenda.

However, the attempt to develop a comprehensive system would somehow lead to
diverse regional and international regulation. And normally, should that occur, a
countless number of initiatives would be enacted with its own specific criteria and
standards. Inevitably, it would create a situation where the cure for the disease is far
more than the dose that is actually needed. It inadvertently creates a situation where
it is difficult to establish a unified system. On that note, the most important new
initiatives after 9/11 will be analysed as following taking into account various
security related threat enumerated earlier in Chapter 2.
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3.3

Maritime security initiatives

3.3.1

Initiatives addressing cargo related risks

To deal with the risks relating to cargo, especially cargo entering the country, the US
has implemented three major initiatives: the C-TPAT, the CSI and the 24-hour Rule.
The C-TPAT is a voluntary85 Government-business-co-operation where participating
businesses sign an Agreement committing them to carry out a comprehensive selfassessment of supply chain security using the C-TPAT security guidelines. The
former Commissioner of US CBP, Robert Bonner said:

C-TPAT is a key component strategy – a strategy designed to increase
security and at the same time facilitate legitimate trade by, among other
things, using advance electronic information to screen all goods coming
to the US; pushing our zone of security beyond our physical borders;
deploying sophisticated inspection technology; and working in
partnership with the trade to substantially increase supply chain security86.

The C-TPAT is designed to strengthen the overall supply chain security in relation to
imported goods 87 . C-TPAT provides verifiable evidence that every organization
participating in this initiative and their suppliers watch every event in the supply
chain. The program requires participants to assess their international supply chains,
develop a security improvement plan if necessary, strengthen security practices,
85
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communicate policies and security requirements to their international supply chain
partners, and monitor and improve security of their supply chain on an ongoing
basis88. By this program, the US authority is putting the onus on US businesses to
ensure that their overseas partners are genuine businesses with secure procedures and
practices in place.

The next initiative, which was launched in January 2002, is the CSI. It is a “multifaceted approach that would affect the design of containers, the algorithms for
identifying high risk boxes and the ability to screen containers at US ports and at
important hubs in Europe and Asia”89. It is consisted of four core elements, namely:
(a)

Identifying ‘potential risk for terrorism’ containers by using automated
targeting tools to identify such containers, based on advance information
and strategic alliance;

(b)

Pre-screening containers destined for US, generally at the port of
origins/departure before loading them to be shipped to the US ports;

(c)

Using advanced technology; include the large-scale X-ray and gamma ray
machines and radiation detection devices, to undertake pre-screening of the
said containers so that the process can be carried out rapidly without
prejudicing the movement of trade in general; and

(d)

Developing and using smart and secure containers for easy detection of the
containers that have been tampered with during shipment by the CBP
officers at the US port of arrival90.

Looking at the above core premises, it can be summarized that the basic principle of
the CSI is to screen cargo containers for security risk at ports of origin or transit
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rather than when they arrive at US ports91. CSI is done based on bilateral agreements
and it is achieved by stationing US CBP and ICE officials at the port of origin with
the agreement of the respective government to identify containers that may pose a
security risk92. In order to be able to participate in CSI, the member state’s customs
administration and the seaport must meet the following three requirements:
(a)

the customs administration must be able to inspect cargo originating,
transiting, exiting, or being transshipped through a country;

(b)

Containers that pose a potential terrorist threat are identified using the latest
information and technology. NII equipment (including gamma or X-ray
imaging capabilities) and radiation detection equipment such as those,
which can screen up to 30 containers per hour must be available and utilized
for conducting such inspections. This equipment is necessary in order to
meet the objective of quickly screening containers without disrupting the
flow of legitimate trade93; and

(c)

The seaport must have regular, direct and substantial container traffic to
ports in the US.

As part of agreeing to join the CSI, a Member State’s Customs Administration and
seaport must also:(a)

Commit to establishing a risk management system to identify potentially
high-risk containers, and automating that system. This system should
include a mechanism for validating threat assessments and targeting
decisions and identifying best practices;

(b)

commit to sharing critical data, intelligence, and risk management
information with the US CBP in order to do collaborative targeting, and
developing an automated mechanism for these exchanges;
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(c)

conduct a thorough port assessment to ascertain vulnerable links in a port’s
infrastructure and commit to resolving those vulnerabilities; and

(d)

Commit to conduct integrity programs to prevent lapses in employee
integrity and to identify and combat breaches in integrity.

The initial objective of the CSI is to engage the 20 major world ports that between
them account for about 70 percent of the 5.7 million sea containers entering the US
annually. Most of the ports (as per Appendix A) have either implemented the
initiative or signed the agreement, together with a number of ports outside the top 20.
As of November 2005, forty-one CSI port agreements were signed where the host
countries allow the preloading inspections of suspected cargoes by the U.S. customs
inspectors stationed in each of those countries94. As CSI is done on bilateral basis, it
does offer some degree of reciprocity where the CSI partner countries can send its
customs officials to the US ports to undertake the pre-screening of ‘suspected’
containers that will be exported to their respective countries from the US ports95.

Albeit the efficient implementation of CSI, there is another important matter that
needs to be solved i.e. to determine the level of risk of each container. This requires
detailed and accurate information which most of the time is unavailable. This leads
to the introduction of the third initiative called the 24-Hour Rule, which was later
mandated by the Trade Act 2002. With effect from December 2, 2002, the CBP
implements this rule and requires ocean carriers to submit cargo manifest earlier and
in greater detail than before96 . Under this new rule, the cargo manifests of U.S.bound containers must be submitted twenty-four hours before it is loaded in a foreign
port to allow CBP to analyze container content information. Ocean carriers must
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submit cargo manifests to CBP twenty-four hours before US-bound containers are
loaded in a foreign port.

Under the old rules, cargo manifests must be filed with Customs upon arrival in a US
port, although, in practice, the vast majority of carriers file their cargo manifest
electronically with Customs forty-eight hours before arrival97. The rule requires not
only advanced submission, but also lists the specific informational elements that
would need to be included in the submitted cargo manifest. Vague cargo terms such
as “FAK”, “general cargo” and “STC” are not acceptable98. Failure to comply with
the rule will result in the cargo being considered as suspicious and a “DNL” message
is issued while still in the foreign port99. If cargo were loaded without prior approval
by CBP, the container would be denied permission to unload at all US ports. In
addition, each violation would be liable to a fine. The diagram below depicted the
inspections percentage of shipping containers that arrived in US ports in 2002-2004.

Table 2: Percentage of the Shipping Containers Inspected

Source: d’Arcy (et. al.)100
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3.3.2

(a)

Initiatives addressing ship-related risks

International Ship and Port Facility Security Code

The most important ships and ports security initiatives imposed after 9/11 was the
ISPS Code introduced by the IMO. From 9 – 13 December 2002, the Diplomatic
Conference on Maritime Security 101 convened at IMO and passed numerous
resolution amending SOLAS 74 including adopting the ISPS Code102. Adopted in
record time103, the ISPS Code rested on the premise that “it was better to detect and
frustrate terrorists as far away as possible from the shores of America” and to
“improve the security of foreign ports and ships, especially those ports which traded
with the US and those ships that visited US ports”104. The Code is part of SOLAS 74,
thus made compliance is mandatory for all the 156 Contacting Governments105 to
SOLAS 74.

The ISPS Code applies to all passenger ships, cargo ships above 500 grt and mobile
offshore drilling units involved in international trade 106 with effect from 1 July
2004107. Though there were some hopes that the deadline would be extended or the
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authorities in-charge of enforcing the Code turning the blind eye, there were only fall
into the “category of wishful thinking” 108 . The implementation of this Code has
neither extensions nor bypasses 109 . In essence, the Code takes the approach that
ensuring the security of ship and port facilities is a risk management activity110, and
that, to determine what security measures are appropriate, an assessment of the risk
must be made in each particular case111. It starts by requiring ship owners to carry
out security assessment including the risks, threats and existing security measures,
the appointment and training of security officers, drawing up of ship security plan,
and implementation of the plan112. Three security levels identified by the Code; i.e.
Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3113. Level 1 connotes the normal operating level or the
minimum appropriate security measures are required. Security Level 2 requires
medium degree of security risk and the Security Level 3 is the highest level of
concern where a security incident is probable or imminent114.

The national authority will then assess ships that have carried out all the
requirements or security organization appointed by the national authority, and if they
were found to have satisfied the ISPS Code requirements, will be awarded the
ISSC115. Starting July 1, 2004, ships involved in international trades that do not carry
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the ISSC will be subjected to very strict port state control measures, including
lengthy delay and even denial of entry. In addition to the adoption of the ISPS Code,
the December 2002 Diplomatic Conference made other amendments to SOLAS 74 to
address ship-related terrorism risks. Amongst these are that ships are required to
permanently mark an IMO ship identification number on the stern or on either side of
the hull116 and to fit an AIS onboard ship117.

The costs either to complying or non-complying to ISPS Code are likely to be
substantial. Over 46,000 ships that are involved in international voyage and almost
4,000 ports serving international trade are required to comply with the ISPS Code118.
“Good security costs money”119. Based on the report by the OECD, at least USD 1.3
billion and USD 730 million thereafter are needed by ship operators to comply with
the Code120. Also worth mentioning that the estimated cost of bringing ports into
compliance with ISPS requirements is hard due to the variation of needs and costs of
meeting those needs for instance labor costs and materials is different from port to
port121. One of the main weaknesses of the ISPS Code is that it only covers ships and
port facilities; interface between the ships and the port; as such it does not cover the
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other facilities along the supply chain or the suppliers of goods122. Another major
weaknesses identified in the ISPS Code is that there is nothing in the ISPS Code that
will stop a ship with an ISSC or any ship to which the ISPS Code does not apply
from transporting terrorism-related materials. To counter this threat, a few nations
led by the US have implemented the Proliferation Security Initiative.

(b) Proliferation Security Initiative

While States have cooperated for many years to combat WMD proliferation and
prevent specific shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials,
these efforts have largely been ad-hoc. However, the increasingly sophisticated and
aggressive measures taken by states and non-state actors to traffic in and obtain these
items require like-minded nations to coordinate efforts to address this urgent
challenge. Worldwide, almost twenty million packages of radioactive materials are
transported annually 123. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an initiative led
by the US, establishing a coalition of countries

124

that will impede and stop

shipments of WMD, its delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from
states125 and non-state actors of proliferation concern.

Launched by President Bush on May 31, 2003, in Krakow, Poland, PSI is an effort
created in response to growing challenge posed by the proliferation of WMD. US
involvement in the PSI stems from the US National Strategy to Combat Weapons of
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Mass Destruction issued in December 2002126. That strategy recognizes the need for
more robust tools to defeat the proliferation of WMD around the world, and
specifically identifies interdiction.

PSI is not a formal treaty-based organization. It is considered as a set of activities
based on participating countries’ common commitment to the PSI Statement of
Interdiction Principles, (as in Appendix B) which was agreed on 4 September 2003.
The PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles establishes the basis for cooperation on
specific activities, when the need arises. It does not create formal “obligations” for
participating states, but does represent a political commitment to stop proliferationrelated shipments whenever possible and to improve national capabilities and
authorities to conduct interdictions127. The PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles
identifies specific steps participants can take to effectively interdict WMD-related
trafficking and prevent proliferation128.

Participation in the PSI is voluntary as it is part of a cooperative international counter
proliferation effort intended to apply intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement,
military, and other tools at the country’s disposal to thwart transfers of WMD-related
items to states and non-state actors of proliferation concern129. In fact, PSI is also
received highest level recognition when in a speech in Madrid, UN Secretary General
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Kofi Annan, encouraged all states to participate in PSI by applauding the efforts of
the PSI to “fill a gap in our defenses”130.

The international coalition is focused on pre-emptive interdiction, seeking to allow
ships, aircraft, and vehicles suspected of carrying WMD-related materials to and
from countries of “proliferation concern” to be detained and searched as soon as they
enter member countries’ territory, territorial waters, or airspace 131 .It will also
encourage member countries to deny overflight rights to suspicious aircraft or ground
them when they stop to refuel. The PSI, however, would have problems of
interdicting a ship suspected of carrying WMD on the high seas. It is because, “a
state cannot act against another state’s vessels 132 ” and without any international
convention or a UNSC Resolution 133 , such interdiction would be a prima facie
breach of international law 134 . It is clear in Article 92(2) of UNCLOS 1982 that
“Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases
provided for in international treaties or in this Convention, shall be subject to its
exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.”

In this respect, the US and like-minded countries are, through the IMO Legal
Committee, proposed a new protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Navigation, 1988.

130

Kofi Annan’s keynote address to the closing plenary of the International Summit of Democracy,
Terrorism and Security delivered on 10 March 2005 in Madrid, Spain. See
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sgsm9757.doc.htm> (Accessed on 23 July 2006)
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Eraydin H., The Security of Maritime Traffic – Current Application of Maritime Law Enforcement
against Terror at Sea and its implication on International Law – In unpublished presentation during
the Fifth Regional Sea power Symposium for the Mediterranean and the Black Sea Navies, Italy, 1314 October 2004.
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Jacobsson M., “Terrorism at Sea” – In Mukherjee P. K. et. al., (eds.) Maritime Violence and other
Security Issues at Sea, Malmo: WMU Publication, 2002, p. 160.
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On 28 April 2004, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1540 on preventing proliferation of
WMD, as it constitutes the threat to international peace and security. The Resolution calls upon all
States to take preventive actions to prevent illicit trafficking of WMD and its related materials, but the
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134
Ibid Beckman, p. 220.
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(c)

The new Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Navigation 1988 and its Protocol 1988135

As discussed before, the SUA 1988 created with aims to address lacunae that
existing in the international system dealing with violence at sea. The new protocol to
the SUA 1988, or what usually termed as the SUA 2005, adopted on 14 October
2005 contains several new provisions that seek to expand the scope of SUA 1988.
The 84th Session of the Legal Committee of IMO saw the SUA Correspondence
Group headed by the US proposed some new necessary amendments to SUA 1988
and its Protocol 19888136. The proposed new amendments for both instruments are to
facilitate, strengthen, and expand international cooperation and coordination as a
means of combating unlawful acts137. The most controversial provisions in the new
SUA 2005 are:(i)

the addition of Article 3 bis on the offences where a mere transport of
prohibited weapons may become an offence under the Convention; and

(ii)

Article 8 bis which allows for the boarding of ships flying the flag of a
State Party beyond territorial seas by another State Party if such ships are
reasonably suspected to be involved in offences under the Convention,
provided that the State Party intending to board must first get the consent
of the flag state. However, the new Protocol also proposes that if the flag
state does not respond within four hours of the request, the requesting
party may proceed “under tacit authorization clause” to board and search
the ship138.

Furthermore, the SUA 2005 makes it an offence if a person unlawfully carries out
onboard a ship any of the acts listed in Article 3 thereof. It lists down scenarios in
135

This is referring to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed
Platform located in the Continental Shelf 1988.
136
Legal Committee of IMO document: LEG 84/6/1 dated 22 March 2002.
137
Mbiah K., “The Revision of the SUA Convention: an Update” – In Contemporary Issues in
Maritime Security, Mejia Jr, M. Q. (ed.), Sweden: WMU Publication, 2005, p. 172.
138
Ibid Beckman, p. 223-224.
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which Contracting Governments will have jurisdiction, and obliges Contracting
Governments either to prosecute or extradite the offender.

3.3.3

Initiatives addressing port-related risks

As stated above, the ISPS Code also aims to address risks relating to ports and port
facilities. Contracting governments have the responsibility to identify what are port
facilities that must comply with the Code. These port facilities then will appoint
security officers, carry out security assessment, send their officers for securities
training, draw out security plan, and implement the plan. The designated authority
appointed by the contracting government will then carry out a security audit and
ultimately, if all the ISPS Code requirements have been satisfied, issue a Statement
of Compliance for the port facility. A port facility that does not possess a Statement
of Compliance after July 1, 2004 will face numerous problems. Ships that visit such
a port facility will be considered security risks at the ports they subsequently visit,
and will probably be subjected to delaying port state control measures. Therefore,
such a port facility will be avoided by ships and will subsequently suffer.

In addition to the ISPS Code, ports involved in maritime trade will be subjected to
the USCG International Port Security Program. The Program, implemented pursuant
to s70108 of the US Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, will see the
USCG, starting May 2004, sending teams to countries around the world to evaluate
their compliance with the ISPS Code and their port security plans. Vessels that make
port calls at countries that are not participants could be delayed when attempting to
enter a US port. It is far more complicated to estimate the cost of bringing ports into
compliance to ISPS Code as the needs and cost varied from one port to another139.

139

Ibid OECD, p. 40-45.
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3.3.4

Initiatives addressing seafarers related risks

In relation to risks posed by maritime workers in particular by ship crew, the
international community, through the IMO, addressed the issue at the 1st Maritime
Safety Committee International Working Group held in February 2002, where the
ISPS Code was originally conceived. However, the matter was eventually forwarded
to the ILO for consideration. Subsequently, in its 91st Annual Conference, the ILO
adopted a new Convention on Seafarers’ Identity Documents, replacing the ILO’s
Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention 1958 (No. 108) to establish a more
rigorous identity regime for seafarers 140 . The new Convention provides for new
seafarers’ identity document for the world’s 1.2million seafarers141. A major feature
of the new ID is a biometrics template based on a fingerprint. It also makes provision
for the facilitation of shore leave and transit and transfer of seafarers, including the
exemption from holding a visa for seafarers taking shore leave. To avoid the risk of
an ID being issued to the wrong person, ratifying member States also have to
maintain proper databases available for international consultation by authorized
officials and to have and observe adequate procedures for the issuance of IDs.

However, it is the US initiatives that have created the most significant impact on the
industry. The US has implemented a range of initiatives designed to address risks
coming from workers employed by its maritime transport industry and by seafarers
employed onboard ships entering the US. Prior to 9/11, the USCG required ships
coming to the US. to submit basic information regarding the ship twenty-four hours
before arrival. After 9/11, the period was extended to 96 hours before arrival, and
more detailed information is required. Concerning persons onboard the vessels,
information required includes the individual’s full name, date of birth, nationality,
passport number, position or duties on ship, and the port or place where the
individual embarked142.
140

See Mitropoulos, p. 154.
Ibid d’Arcy, p. 139.
142
Ibid Roach, p. 359.
141
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This information will be subjected to check including by the intelligence community.
Also before 9/11, crewmembers of foreign vessels calling at US ports did not have to
undergo the normal procedure for the issuance of visas. The US immigration
authorities issued a blanket visa to the crew of a ship prior to the ship’s arrival, based
on the official crew list provided by the owner. However the crew list visa is now
abolished. Now, despite the agreement at ILO on biometric identity cards of
seafarers, any foreign crewmember that wants to go for shore leave in the US will
have to possess a valid personal passport and a valid US visa143. Douglas Stevenson
of the New York based Center for Seafarers’’ Rights condemned the US decision to
deny shore leave due to security concern as shore leave is an “elemental necessity”
for the seafarers who have been months on board144. Even with valid passports and
visas, there is no guarantee that seafarers will be allowed to leave the ship. CBP
officials will subject citizens of certain countries to additional security checks.

In addition, the discretion given to officers at US diplomatic posts overseas to grant
so-called “personal appearance waivers” has been eliminated. This means that
seafarers must appear personally at US consulates to apply for their visas. A ship
with crewmembers not possessing a US visa is considered a security risk. The ship
will also be considered a security risk if the USCG, the INS and other relevant
agencies, after receiving the 96-hour arrival notice and carrying out further
examination, deemed it to be such. In these cases, crewmembers will usually be
subjected to a “detain on board” order. Even if a particular crewmember possesses a
valid passport and visa, the “detain on board” status can still be conferred. When a
“detain on board” order is made, the detained crewmember cannot leave the ship and
the ship is required to hire a minimum of two private security guards for the duration
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144

The Sea, Issue 169, May/June 2004, p. 1.
The Sea, Issue 161, Jan/Feb 2003, p. 3.
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of the vessel’s stay. This is to prevent the crewmember under the “detain on board”
status from illegally leaving the ship145.

Another initiative that addresses risk coming from seafarers on board ships entering
the US is the NSEERS. It was implemented in all US ports of entry on 11 September
2002 146 , exactly a year after the attack of 9/11. Temporary foreign visitors (nonimmigrant aliens including ship crew) to the US to whom the NSEERS applies; i.e.
arriving from certain countries147, or who met a combination of intelligence-based
criteria, and are identified as presenting an elevated national security concerns will
have to undergo a national registration process that includes undergoing interview
and being photographed and fingerprinted148. According to the DHS, the NSEERS 149
promotes several important national security objectives: among them are:(a)

allow the US to run the fingerprints of aliens who may present elevated
national security concerns against a database of wanted criminals and
known terrorists;

(b)

enables DHS to determine instantly when such an alien has overstayed his
visa; which was the case with three of the 9/11 hijackers150; and

(c)

enables DHS to verify that an alien in the US on the temporary visa is doing
what he said he would be doing, living where he said he would be living151.
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It is reported in The Sea, Issue 161, Jan/Feb 2003 that in Louisiana port, one ship is placed under
armed guard and when 3 of the crew stepped of the gangway to feel the dry land, they were fined
USD3500 each.
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The Domestic Call-in Registration later followed NSEERS on 5 November 2002.
147
The domestic registration program included citizens or nationals from Afghanistan, Algeria,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Eritrea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Lebanon, Morocco,
North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab
Emirates, and Yemen.
148
For further reading on NSEERS, refer to <http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3020>
(Accessed on 16 June 2006)
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NSEERS was the first step taken by the Department of Justice and then Department of Homeland
Security in order to comply with the development of the U.S. Congress, which mandated an allinclusive entry-exit program.
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See 9/11 Commission Report, pg. 273.
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It is worthy to note that the list of countries are among them are Bangladesh and
Indonesia. Thus, some shipping companies are denying jobs to Muslim seafarers
because they are so-called, potential security risks. Any seafarers with the middle
name “bin” is potential terrorist, even the word is actually hailed of Arabic origin,
which essentially means ‘son of’ 152 . On 2 December 2003, some controversial
registration and tracking system; i.e. the 30/40-Day Follow-up and Annual Reregistration were suspended from the NSEERS, but other requirements continue to
remain in effect153.

3.4

Maritime Transportation Security Act 2002

One of the most important initiatives taken by the U.S. that has the significant impact
in the world shipping is the MTSA 2002. Signed on November 25, 2002, MTSA
2002 is designed to protect the US waterways and ports from any aggressive act of
terrorism. In other words, the Act is the US version of the ISPS Code 154 . Key
features of MTSA 2002 are: (a)

requirements for port, facility, and vessel vulnerability assessments;

(b)

preparation by the Secretary of Transportation of a National Maritime
Transportation Security Plan and Area Plans for each Coast Guard Captain
of Port Zone;

(c)

development of security plans for certain facilities and commercial vessels;

(d)

the issuance and use of Transportation Security Cards for personnel whose
responsibilities require them to access secure places aboard ships;

(e)

establishment of a permanent programme of grants to facilitate the
enhancement of maritime security;
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Osler D., “Malaysian seafarers face ‘employment prejudice’” – in Lloyd’s List, 23 September 2005,
p. 8.
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See <http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/16965prs20031201.html> (Accessed on 25 June 2006)
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Kulisch E., “Tethering Cargo Security Standards” – In American Shipper, Vol. 48, No. 1, January
2006, Florida: Jacksonville Publications p. 32. See also <http://www.uscg.mil.hq/gcp/comrel/factfile/Factcards/MTSA2002.htm> (Accessed on 5 June 2006)

47

(f)

assessment by the Secretary of Transportation of the effectiveness of the
antiterrorism measures at foreign ports;

(g)

establishment of an enhanced system of foreign seafarer identification;

(h)

creation of a Maritime Security Advisor Committee at national and area
levels;

(i)

installation and operation of AIS aboard certain commercial vessels;

(j)

establishment of a program to better secure international intermodal
transportation systems, to include cargo screening, tracking, physical
security, compliance monitoring, and related issues;

(k)

provision of civil penalties for violation of statutes and regulations;

(l)

extension of seaward jurisdiction of the Espionage Act of 1917 to 12
nautical miles offshore of the territorial sea baseline;

(m) codification of the USCG Sea Marshall program and consideration of
utilising merchant mariners and other personnel to assist the Coast Guard;
(n)

requirements that shipment data be provided electronically to U.S. Customs
prior to arrival or departure of cargo;

(o)

reporting by the Secretary of Transportation to Congress on foreign/flag
vessels calling to US ports; and

(p)

developing of standards and curricula for maritime security professional
training155.

It is estimated by the US Coast Guard that the cost involving the compliance and
implementation of MTSA 2002 and its related provisions to be approximately
USD1.125billion

initially

and

USD699million
156

USD5.45billion for the next 10 years

every

year

thereafter

or

.
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Kumar S. N., Vellenga D., “Port Security Costs in the U.S.: a Public Policy Dilemma” – In
International Maritime Economists Annual Conference 2004, IAME Izmir 2004, Conference
Proceedings (pp. 35-44), Izmir: Dokuz Eylul Publications.
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3.5

Initiatives – a summing up

In summing up a workable policy environment post 9/11, it is proven that it is harder
than said due to little information or data that would be an impetus to have practical
policy decision. Attacks on World Trade Centre and the Pentagon were not remote
attacks where organized terrorist groups with immense financial resources, intensive
training and the most important commitment have carried out those attacks. Attacks
against the maritime interests similar to 9/11 have been formulated on the “testable
hypotheses” due to sheer volume and international nature of shipping industry itself
as well as the possible consequences of such attacks157.
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“New Port Security Regulations will require Billions in Investment” – In Port Technology
International, 21st ed., spring 2004, London: Henley Publishing Ltd., p. 152.
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Kerr W. A., “Homeland Security and the Rules of International Trade” – In the Estey Journal of
International Law and Trade Policy, vol. 5, no. 1 2004, pp. 1-4.
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CHAPTER 4

FACILITATION OF INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TRAFFIC

“Recognizing that the Convention on the Facilitation on Maritime Traffic,
1965, as amended, provides that foreign crew members shall be allowed
ashore by the public authorities while the ship on which they arrive is in
port, provided that the formalities on arrival of the ship have been fulfilled
and the public authorities have no reason to refuse permission to come
ashore for reasons of public health, public safety or public order,
Contracting Governments, when approving ship and port facility security
plans, shall pay due cognizance to the fact that ship’s personnel live and
work on the vessel and need shore leave and access to shore-based seafarer
welfare facilities, including medical care.”
-

4.1

Preamble 11 of the ISPS Code

Introduction

A ships master once recounted his encounters with time-consuming bureaucratic
procedures in the following words158:

Entering the port of XXX from an international voyage, the shipmaster heaves
a sigh relief on having safely accomplished the voyage and philosophically
awaits the arrival of the harbor authorities. However, besides the traditional
glass of cheer normally provided, the port health, immigration and customs

50

officers, the harbor master, harbor police, terminal representative and clerk,
duly board the ship and demand of our poor shipmaster no fewer than 109
pieces of paper, including nearly 50 separate documents, before they depart.
Bills, lists manifests, summaries declarations and statements; and no passenger
can disembark nor can a cargo be loaded or discharged until the correct forms
have been produced to the right person. Up to 12 copies of a single document
are demanded and it is no use for our shipmaster to inform the police that the
immigration and customs officers have taken all his crew lists – they have to be
given their own copies.

However, our shipmaster is an expert paper shuffler and all goes well at the
port of ‘XXX’. The ship clears following the production of even more paper
and turns south for port ‘YYY’ where, he reflects with relief, a mere 100 pieces
of paper with a trivial 33 documents will be required. Regrettably the
authorities at port ‘YYY’ refuse to accept any of the forms prepared for port
‘XXX’ since their format differs and the form filling is required all over again.

All this is very humorous until the utter waste of labor is taken into account.
‘XXX’ and ‘YYY’ are merely given as examples, perhaps worse than most, but
are indicative of the hundreds of man-hours wasted by increasingly expansive
staff in satisfying the burgeoning appetite of bureaucrats throughout the world.

158

This humorous classic account of a problem shown the dilemma is experienced by the seafarers in
ports that fail to adhere to the facilitation procedures.
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Frequently through the unfamiliarity with the documentation demanded in
foreign ports, expansive delays occur, tides are lost and stevedores stand idle
awaiting the march of paper.159

Precedents, conventions and regulations essentially control most human activities,
shipping included. These are of utmost importance in order to ensure the safe and
secure environment for any of those activities to flourish – but there were cases
where these regulations cause more unnecessary and significant burden on the
activities that it supposed to control. Due to its global nature, international maritime
transport also becomes the victim of the above problem. Various countries
exclusively developed excessive control and ‘inefficient’ customs procedures
practices as well as immigration and other standards totally independent of each
other. Coupled with that, the prevalent monopoly of service providers in key entry
points in importing countries adds to the complication of the matters160. This resulted
in ships calling at different countries during the voyage expecting to be presented
with a series of forms to fill in, which usually ask for almost the same information
but to some extent in a different way161. For example, in Chittagong port, the second
largest port of Bangladesh, shipmaster has to fill in 30 different forms compared with
seven, say, in Malaysia162.
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Felding S. E., “Introduction of the Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Transport,
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The sheer number of documents further raised another concern, i.e. the format of
each document163. From one port to another, the forms varied from one neighboring
port to the other ports of calls. The varying degree of forms and procedures that
needs to be adhered to add burden to shipmasters and crew. It should be further noted
that paperwork and shipping documentation grew in tandem with shipping and trade
development in the early part of the twentieth century. By 1950s, it was no longer a
matter of inconvenience but has become a threat. The complication was further
aggravated when the shipmasters had to deal with local language translation,
consular visa requirements, authenticity of the information that the documents
contain, etc. Finally, of course, these painstaking and time consumption procedures
have led to delays or demurrage costs for ships164.

The US Pacific Coast shipping industry in co-operation with the School of World
Business, San Francisco State College, California produced a report entitled
Merchant Shipping on a Sea of Red Tape on 1 April 1959. The report sought to
compare the documentary requirements and procedures of the two most important
transport modes; international shipping and international airline industry. It is found
that international shipping is in dire need to be unchained of its “self-inflicted
bureaucracy”. Whilst aircraft was only required to have three or four documents to
land in foreign countries, ships need no fewer than twenty-two, thirty-two or at the
most, forty-six separate documents to be in ports. Thus, the report concluded that:(a)

ships documentation need to be simplified urgently and the demands of
individual Governments had to be put in clear perspective with the overall
welfare of merchant shipping;

163

Kouassivi A. M. F. (1997), Facilitation of Maritime Transport Document Procedures: a Case
Study of Benin – Master of Science Dissertation, World Maritime University, Malmo, Sweden, p. 7.
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the cost saving due to unification, simplification and standardization165 to

(b)

both industry and Governments were significant to motivate immediate
actions;
(c)

establishment of ICAO and its experience to regulate airlines business could
provide a pattern for action; and

(d)

to

achieve

successful

outcome

of

documentation

simplification,

Governments have to co-operate among themselves166.

A Workshop on Standardization of International Travel and Transport Documents
held in Beijing in 1993 also found that the enormous amount of paperwork is needed
to import or export consignments in ports in South Asia167 as shown in the following
Table 2.

Table 3: Number of paperwork to import and export consignment in South Asia

India

Nepal

Pakistan

Types of documents

29

83

15

No. of copies

118

102

108

No. of signatures required

256

113

56

Manpower required

7

22

11

Estimate costs of procedures

10 percent of consignments value

Source: UNESCAP report
165

Unification – the process of combining several similar documents whenever possible;
Simplification – the process of elimination (or at least modified) of superfluous data and unnecessary
documents; and standardization – the development of definite size, format and language for
documents designed for a specific purpose and use, and their general acceptance by and use
throughout the industry.
166
See Focus of IMO December 1996, “Cutting Red Tape: IMO and the Facilitation of Maritime
Travel
and
Transport”,
available
online
at
<http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataonly.asp/data_id%3D7998/FALFocus1996.pdf> (Accessed
on 30 July 2006)
167
This is based on the report “Trade Facilitation and Electronic Commerce as Catalysts for
Integration” done by United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.
Available online at <http://www.unescap.org/chap4_2054.pdf> (Accessed on 7 August 2006)
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4.2

Facilitation and IMO

The need to facilitate maritime transportation has long been recognized since the
inception of IMCO 168 back in 1959. Maritime nations, deciding that the issue of
facilitation of international maritime transport could not be allowed to deteriorate
further, had turned to IMCO for solution to this ever pressing matter169. Thus, an
international conference on Facilitation of Maritime Travel and Transport was
convened in 1965 at IMCO and attended by representatives of 68 countries, 38 of
them being developing countries and 15 intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations. This conference concluded that “formalities, documentation, and
procedures on arrival and departure of ships should be simplified and public
authorities should only require ships calling at their ports to produce only eight listed
documents in Standard 2.1”.

The conference adopted the FAL Convention on 9 April 1965 and it entered into
force almost two years after its inauguration, i.e. on 5 March 1967. To date, there are
107 Contracting Governments to the Convention representing 68.67% of world
tonnage170. The list of Contracting Governments is as attached in Appendix C. The
Convention has also endorsed the creation of the FAL Committee which since its
initiation in 1973 met annually (with the exception of 2001), i.e. 33 times, the last
being from 3-7 July 2006.

168

The name of the organization was changed to “International Maritime Organization” (IMO) by
virtue of the amendments to the Organization’s Convention, which entered into force on 22 May 1982.
169
The real starting point of the idea of facilitation and solving the problem pertaining to voyage of
ships, their arrival, stay and departure from ports was in the forum of the Organization of American
States (OAS) which took place at the Inter-American ports and harbours conference held at San Jose,
Costa Rica in 1956. The conference issued a declaration aimed at the simplification and
standardization of port formalities and documentation requirements.
170
As of 30 June 2006. Further information,
<http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D14919/status.xls> (Accessed on 7
August 2006)
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The Convention and its annexes trimmed down the numbers of documents required
by the authorities at the port to eight171. IMO, in particular reference to the work of
the FAL Committee, developed six A4 Standard Forms known as IMO Model
Forms172 (as in Appendix D). These forms set down, among others, formalities and
practices, the status/purpose of a form, copies of each document to be presented by
ship owners at the arrival and departure of a ship173. The forms are:(a)

IMO general declaration – provides all important information about the
ship;

(b)

cargo declaration - information about the cargo on board;

(c)

crew list declaration – information about the who’s who in the crew
member;

(d)

passengers list declaration – information about the passengers (if any) on
board;

(e)

ships’ stores declaration – information about the ship’s stores; and

(f)

crew’s effects declaration – information on the personal effects of the
crew174.

The other two documents are those, which are required by the Universal Postal
Convention and International Health Regulations. It should be further noted that the
first four declaration enumerated above constitute the maximum information
necessary and the other subsequent two incorporated the agreed essential minimum
information requirements.

171

See FAL.2/Circ. 87 dated 17 December 2004 on the “Revised List of Certificates and Documents
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It should be noted that facilitation measures pertaining to shipping, in general, are
applicable to all parts of the world and comprise of two main closely interrelated
elements. They are:(a)

Facilitation in shipping documentation – IMO175

(b)

Facilitation in trade documentation – UNCTAD

4.3

Objectives and the development of the Convention

Overall, the objectives leading to the development of this so-called co-operative
treaty are “to prevent unnecessary delays in maritime traffic, to aid cooperation
between Governments, and to secure the highest practicable degree of uniformity in
formalities and other procedures. In particular, the Convention reduces to just eight
the number of declarations which can be required by public authorities”176.

Briefly, those objectives can be achieved by undertaking the following:(a)

Simplification – to adopt all appropriate measures to facilitate and expedite
international maritime traffic and to prevent unnecessary delays to ships,
and persons and property on board;

(b)

Unification – to co-operate in the formulation and application of measures
on the facilitation of arrival, stay and departure of ships combining similar
documents;

(c)

Standardization – to develop a general format in securing the

highest

practicable degree of uniformity in formalities, documentary requirements
and procedures in all matters in which to facilitate and improve international
maritime traffic and keep to a minimum any alterations in formalities,
documentary requirements and procedures necessary to meet special
requirements of a domestic nature: and
175

The dissertation paper will only address this first element. In order to avoid duplication of work,
IMO has agreed with UNCTAD to deal with works relating to shipping and trade documentation
between IMO and UNCTAD respectively.
176
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(d)

Harmonization – to co-operate and assist each other through the IMO in
matters relating to formalities, documentary requirements and procedures,
as well as their application to international maritime traffic177.

4.4

The FAL Convention revisited

The FAL Convention consists of178:(a)

Articles i.e. the main body of the Convention itself;
There are 15 articles to the Convention, and the most important articles are
as following:(i)

Article I – In this article, the Contracting Governments give
commitment to adopt all appropriate measures to “facilitate and
expedite international maritime traffic and to prevent unnecessary
delays to ships and persons and property on board”;

(ii)

Article II talks about the commitment of the Contracting
Governments to “co-operate”, “in the formulation and application
of measures for the facilitation of the arrival, stay and departure of
ships”. And as many other IMO conventions, this Convention also
do not apply to warships and pleasure yachts;

(iii) Article III entails that the Contracting Governments will “cooperate in securing the highest degree of uniformity in formalities,
documentary requirements and procedures in all matters” in order
to ensure the smooth flowing of international maritime traffic. Any
alterations to such “formalities, documentary requirements and
procedures” deem required to meet special domestic requirements
are to be done at the minimum levels so that it would not hamper
the smooth flow of maritime traffic;
177
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(iv) Article IV allows the Contracting Governments to work among
them on achieving the objectives of the Convention, i.e. ensure the
smooth flowing of maritime trade, or to work with the IMO as an
alternative;
(v)

Article V, paragraph (2) states the provision that by being a State
Party to this Convention does not mean that any Contracting
Governments shall not apply any measures it deems necessary to
“preserve public morality, order and security or to prevent the
introduction or spread of disease or pests affecting public health,
animals and plants”;

(vi) Article VI defines what constitute “Standards” and “Recommended
Practices”. “Standard are those measures the uniform application
of which by Contracting Governments in accordance with the
Convention is necessary and practicable in order to facilitate
international maritime traffic”; and “Recommended Practices are
those measures the application of which Contracting Governments
is desirable in order to facilitate international maritime traffic”;
(vii) Article VII stipulates the methods of making amendments to the
annex to the Convention;
(viii) Article VIII (1) of the FAL Convention provides that when the
Contracting Government that “find it impracticable to comply with
any standard by bringing its own formalities, documentary
requirements or procedures into full accord with it or which deems
it necessary for special reasons to adopt formalities, documentary
requirements or procedures differing from the Standard, shall
inform the Secretary General and notify him of the differences
between its own practice and such Standard”. The same procedure
applies to new or amended Standards. The text of selected
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notifications

received

from

Contracting

Governments

in

compliance with this provision is as attached in Annexure; and
(ix) Article IX stipulates the method of making revisions and
amendments to the Convention.

(b)

Consolidated text of the annex to the Convention;
In almost all technical conventions, for example MARPOL 73/78 or SOLAS
74, the annexes constitute the ‘meat’ of those conventions179 without which
the conventions would not be comprehensive. In FAL Convention, the
annexes were the place where the Standards and Recommended Practices on
formalities, documentary requirements and procedures were thoroughly
explained. The annexes have six sections as following: (i)

Section 1 – Definitions and general provisions;

(ii)

Section 2 – Arrival, Stay and Departure of the Ship;

(iii) Section 3 – Arrival and Departure of Persons;
(iv) Section 4 – Arrival, Stay and Departure of Cargo and other Articles;
(v)

Section 5 – Public Health and Quarantine, Including Sanitary
Measures for Animals and Plants; and

(vi) Miscellaneous Provisions.

(c)

Six Resolutions adopted by the Conference;
(i)

Resolution 1 – Encouragement of acceptances of and accession to
the Convention

(ii)

Resolution 2 – Acceptance of Standards

(iii) Resolution 3 – The creation of national and regional committees
(iv) Resolution 4 – Establishment of an ad hoc working group
(v)

Resolution 5 – Future work on facilitation

(vi) Resolution 6 – Facilitation of international travel and tourism
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(d)

Resolution A.628 (15) adopted by the Assembly on the “Application of
automatic data processing (ADP) as provided for in the Convention on
Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, 1965, as amended”; and

(e)

Appendices 1 – 6 provide additional information on facilitation
requirements as following: (i)

Appendix 1 – IMO FAL Forms

(ii)

Appendix 2 – Simpler shipping marks

(iii) Appendix 3 – IMDG Code: Documentation of dangerous goods
shipments
(iv) Appendix 4 – Format of the letter referred to in Standard 3.3.1
(v)

Appendix 5 – Certificates and documents required to be carried on
board ships

(vi) Appendix 6 – Supplement relating to the annex to the Convention:
Differences between the national practices of Contracting
Governments and the Standards and Recommended Practices
contained in the annex as notified to IMO.

4.5

Amendments to FAL Convention

Starting 1973 and eventually since 1 January 1987, a series of amendments in
addition to various Resolutions were adopted to bring the Convention up-to-date with
the present international situation especially in relation to the introduction of
information communication technology. This is the reason why most of the time; the
Convention was referred to as the Convention on Facilitation International Maritime
Traffic, 1965, as amended. Among the most important amendments180 are: -
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4.5.1

The 1973 Amendments

Before this 1973 amendment was incorporated, any amendment to the Convention
required two-thirds acceptance of the Contracting Governments to enter into force.
The increasing number of Contracting Governments makes it difficult to achieve the
required two-thirds acceptance. Thus, to solve the problem, the ‘tacit acceptance’
was introduced where any amendment to the FAL Convention 1965 will enter into
force on a predetermined date as long as it is not explicitly rejected by certain
number or percentage of the Contracting Governments 181 . However, this 1973
amendment, bound by the previous original amendment procedure took more than
ten years i.e. on 2 June 1984 to enter into force. During this period of ten years, there
was no other new proposal for amendments undertaken by the FAL Committee.
Subsequently, as soon as this amendment entered into force, the FAL Committee
then met to do all the other necessary and pending ‘package of amendments’ to the
Convention to ‘reflect even current practice’.

4.5.2

The 1986 Amendments

The 1986 Amendments was aimed at permitting the use of automatic data processing
(ADP) and other modern communications techniques. Entering into force on 1
October 1986, it allows the usage of EDI, which basically means ‘computers talk to
each other directly’. The introduction of EDI increases business efficiency as well
greater flexibility and faster access to information. Total number of staff required
doing certain tasks, like keying-in data and the need for constantly making telephone
calls, such as to track the whereabouts of cargo, were reduced. Despite its advantages,
EDI is not as popular as it is forecasted to be. One of the apparent reasons is that lack
of common language and standards, which are absolutely required to allow the
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computers to ‘talk’ directly 182 . But this setback was later being resolved by the
introduction of EDIFACT 183 , which universalized and standardized computer
language in 1987184. Commencing then, shipping companies as well as others in the
industry have properly accepted EDI, using EDIFACT and the European customs
authorities agreed on the EDIFACT standard paperless trading.

4.5.3

The 1987 Amendments

Entered in force 1 January 1989, the Convention was amended to upgrade a number
of recommended practices to standards. Standard 2.3.4 requires public authorities to
accept a cargo manifest instead of the Cargo Declaration and standard 2.6.1 makes
the contents of Crew List simpler where public authorities shall not call for more
than the name and nationality of the ship, family name, given names, rank or rating,
date and place of birth, nature and number of identity document, port and date of
arrival, and arriving from. There are other amendments also which address the issue
of facilitating the arrival and departure of ships engaged in disaster relief work,
pollution combating operations and similar activities, which undoubtedly required
speedy operations.

4.5.4

The May 1990 Amendments

These amendments entered into force on 1 September 1991, also under the ambit of
tacit acceptance procedure. These amendments revised and added several
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recommended practices including the issue of stowaways 185 and the traffic flow
arrangements.

4.5.5

The 1992 Amendments

The 1992 amendments incorporated an addition of a new section dealing with EDP
and EDI and other changes with regards to private gift packages and trade samples,
consular formalities and fees, submission of pre-import information, clearance of
specialized equipment and forged documents. Entered into force on 1 September
1993, the amendments also restructured the annex of the Convention to bring it in
sequence with the subsequent provisions of the ICAO Convention.

4.5.6 The 1993 amendments

Several amendments were undertaken in 1993, which eventually entered into force
on 1 June 1994. Noting the complication faced by the masters and owners in
disembarking stowaways from ships, the Convention has been amended to handle the
issue with regard to stowaways186.
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A stowaway is a person who is secreted on a ship, or in cargo which is subsequently loaded on the
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4.5.7 The 2002 Amendments

This is one of the most pertinent amendments, which was adopted nearly five months,
i.e. 10 January 2002 and entered into force on 1 May 2003, after the 9/11 attacks
against the U.S. The amendments further add new standards and recommended
practices for dealing with stowaways. Another amendment is also undertaken to FAL
Form 7 – Dangerous Goods Manifest187, where it is reflected as a basic document for
public authorities to be informed on the dangerous goods on board when checking on
those dangerous goods on board ships. This new FAL Form adds up the number of
standard forms used by ships on arrival at ports to seven, i.e. FAL Form 1 – General
Declaration, FAL Form 2 – Cargo Declaration, FAL Form 3 – Ship’s Stores
Declaration, FAL Form 4 – Crew’s Effects Declaration, FAL Form 5 – Crew List,
FAL Form 6 – Passenger List (if any) and FAL Form 7 – the new Dangerous Goods
Manifest.

4.5.8

The 2005 Amendments

Intended to modernize the Convention, the 2005 amendments created on 7 July 2005
and will enter into force on 1 November 2006 include the following: (a)

Recommended practices: (i) for public authorities to have necessary mechanism in place to ensure
that information relayed prior to arrival and departure could be
utilized towards facilitation and thus expediting the release and
clearance of cargo and crew; and
(ii) An establishment of a focal point so that all required information
could be directed to instead of sending to several points, which means
duplication.
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(b)

information to be transmitted electronically for expedited communication
and to save paper;

(c)

security related measures were introduced, with special reference to ISPS
Code and SOLAS Chapter XI-2, in the Standards and Recommended
Practices; and

(d)

4.6

IMO Standardized FAL Forms (1 to 7) to be amended.

Other international conventions on facilitation

UNCTAD together with other international organizations especially the WCO, have
accepted a number of facilitation-oriented agreements and conventions, among them
are:-

4.6.1 International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of
Customs Procedures, 1973 (Kyoto Convention)

As said before, among the most important problem the shipping industry is facing are
those related to customs procedures and documentations. It had been noted that the
movements of goods had become expansive to both carriers and shippers because of
excessive customs procedures and documentations, which were having some serious
negative impacts on the smooth flowing of the international trade. Thus, in order to
solve this problem, the CCoC188 drafted and adopted the International Convention on
the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures, which is also known
as the Kyoto Convention. It came into force on September 1975 and number of
contracting parties as of 1 August 2006 is 50 countries as Appendix F.189
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The manifest includes references to the relevant provisions of SOLAS 1974 Chapter VII (Carriage
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This Convention was divided into two main parts; 19 Articles and sets of annexes.
As most of other technical convention, the articles of this Convention only set out the
scope, structure, and administrative matters. The most important is the annexes of the
Convention, which detailed out separate customs procedures and gave guidance for
simplifying and harmonizing national customs formalities190. They initially cover the
following areas: - aimed at the “reduction of excessive customs procedures” by
“simplifying and harmonizing” the local customs traditions; among others:(a)

Customs formalities prior to the lodgment of goods declaration;

(b)

Clearance of imported goods for home use;

(c)

Origin of goods;

(d)

Exportation;

(e)

Procedures for suspension of payment of duty;

(f)

Special customs procedures; and

(g)

Customs external relations191.

Being seen as one of the most useful customs procedures, the Kyoto Convention has
been an instrument of modernization to the customs procedures worldwide. Series of
amendments to the Convention have been undertaken to bring it up-to-date to the
current situation. The new revised Kyoto Convention has entered into force on 3
February 2006 and it is widely regarded as a “blueprint for modern and efficient
customs procedures in the 21st Century192.
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4.6.2 Customs Convention on Containers, 1972

Chapter 2 has enumerated in detail on the introduction of containerization, which has
revolutionized the shipping industry. Though widely welcomed as one of the most
efficient means of carrying general cargo, containerization was always the subject of
a tug of war between both shipowners and customs authorities193. An extension to the
world wide use of the first customs container drawn in 1956 by the members off
Economic Community of Europe (ECE), the CCC 72 was also being placed under
the administration of CCoC. Objectives of CCC 72 were to develop and facilitate
international carriage of containers following the introduction of the containerization.
As said earlier, it should be noted that containers have been causing a rift between
customs whether to regard them as part of the cargo or separate unit. Different way
of treating them lead to different kinds of implication; economically and legally.
Thus the Convention sought to solve this kind of misinterpretation so that the world
shipping is not being slowed down with this simple yet important matter.

4.6.3 International Convention on Multimodal Transport of Goods, 1982

The United Nations Convention on Multimodal Transport of Goods, 1982 was
adopted on 24 May 1980194. Not yet entered into force and the writer doubts that it
will eventually enter into force based on the fact that it has been adopted more than
26 years ago, the Convention did provide some basis on the facilitation of
international maritime traffic, where it provides, among others, “the need to stimulate
the development of smooth, economic and efficient multimodal transport service
adequate to the requirements of the trade concerned” and “the need to facilitate
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customs procedures with the consideration to the problems of transit countries”195.
A major objective of the multimodal transport operations is to facilitate door-to-door
transport of goods on a single transport document. It makes provisions for simpler
customs procedures due to one single transport document. It is seen as “manifestation
of the international community’s effort to make all countries enjoy the benefits of
technological advances being made in transport and distribution”196.

195
196

Selected preamble of the Convention on International Multimodal Transport, 1982.
Ibid Alorsor, p. 54.
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CHAPTER 5

THE TWIN GOALS: SECURITY AND FACILITATION

“Within a few days, as we saw the effect of Level One alert at our
borders, I also realised that we needed to develop a strategy to secure the
movement of trade to the U.S., but to do so without unduly impeding the
flow of trade that is so important to our, and the world’s, economy. That is
to say, we needed a strategy to accomplish what I have referred to as our
Twin Goals: Security AND Facilitation”

-

Robert C. Bonner,

Former Commissioner, US Customs and Border Protection

5.1

Introduction

The writer has extensively discussed the risks of terrorist related activities that exist
in, around and relating to the entire network of the supply chain in Chapter 2. As said
before, the supply chain can be broadly defined as all the processes and procedures
undertaken to ensure that goods (and services) reach its final destination; i.e. end
users or consumers who would eventually end up paying for it. There are
undoubtedly risks along these supply chains and the writer has also discussed in
details in Chapter 3 on the worldwide measures undertaken by the IMO and the
biggest trading nation; the US to mitigate such risks.

In this fifth chapter, the writer seeks to examine positive and negative relationships
between those maritime security measures and the quest to facilitate the efficiency of
international maritime trade; and then try to look for some acceptable balances of
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both in order not to be prejudicial of one against the other. The importance of
‘smooth movement of commodities from one port to the other has been the real basis
for peaceful development of economies from ancient time till present day’ must never
be disregard197.

It should be noted, as said before, prior to Sept. 11, 2001, stakeholders when
discussing about freight transportation security had primarily focused on means and
mechanisms on how to control those freights of thefts and pilferage as well as to
reduce the illegal introduction and entry of contraband items such as drugs, firearms,
illegal immigrants, etc. into the country. Save for 9/11 catastrophe has altered the
whole paradigm of this security outlook. Immediately after the attack, there were
some ‘acceptable and inevitable’ disruptions of trade flow, yet additional friction
trading cost due to tighter security measures seemingly affected trade worldwide198.

One of them is freight security, which is now been viewed as to secure that freight
from falling into the hands of terrorists either to use it as an arsenal of attacks or
utilise it to finance their operations. Nevertheless, do the security concerns would be
a trade-off to the flourishing international maritime trade that we are having now.
There were also rising concerns over the financial costs versus the security benefits
and its effect of trade efficiency199. The Booz Allen Hamilton security war game
mentioned earlier in Chapter 2 clearly unfolded the challenges of striking an intricate
balance between security and efficiency200. Accordingly, how best can we achieve
the dual objectives of “global maritime security” and “global trade facilitation and
efficiency”.
197
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Stakeholders be it public or private believe that with the right strategies and tactics,
security related risks can and able to be reduced and simultaneously contributed
greatly to the productivity and effectiveness of the whole network of supply chain.
But what are then the right strategies and tactics? How to deal with all these security
challenges effectively without jeopardizing the importance of allowing the free flow
of the legitimate trade. In other simple words, how can we best stop illegitimate trade
without causing any disruption (or at least inflicting minimal problem) to genuine
trade? H. L. Lee and M. Wolfe in their article entitled “Supply Chain without Tears”
speak in detail of the feasible means to address the issue of supply chain security
while having in mind the need to facilitate the international maritime trade. Both Lee
and Wolfe suggested the adoption of the “1970’s and 1980’s Quality Revolution”,
the “Win-win Situation” and the application of both concepts into the supply chain
security to achieve the dual objectives of supply chain security and supply chain
efficiency201.

5.2

The 1970’s and 1980’s Quality Revolution

Back in 1970’s and the 80’s, the drive for quality started as the “best way of ensuring
customer loyalty, the best defence against foreign competition and the only way to
secure continuous growth and profits in difficult market conditions”202. This quality
movement gave the notion that defects (not doing things right at the first place) can
be very costly to a company203. Defective products (or unsatisfactory services) in the
market can lead to yet another failures which usually termed as “external failure
costs or non-conformance costs”, i.e. unable to process customer’s expectation,
increased liability, products recall, repair, payment of damages, affecting negatively
201
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on any future sales, and even in some instances, might cause catastrophic effects to
the society. All these associated costs being put together would eventually end up
being higher than the cost of the product itself204. Thus, the quest towards achieving
higher improvement of quality becomes paramount205. Though requiring “patience
and continuous, steady effort” 206 , industries soon embrace into what is usually
termed as TQM. It is a process of ensuring:
The maximum effectiveness and efficiency of everything that is done
within on organization. It provides market and sector leadership, by the
establishment of processes and systems which promote excellence;
prevent errors and waste without duplication, and ensures that every
aspect of the organization is aligned to the needs of both the external and
internal customer207.

To achieve high quality standards, a total organizational focus must be adopted.
Everybody in an organization must know the imperativeness of quality. It is the sole
responsibility of the quality control department or quality supervisor. It should be
regarded as the responsibility of all in the organization. The best way to ensure high
quality in the first instance is to prevent defect from happening at the time the
product (or service) being produced. It is more like a preventive strategy, which
203
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emphasizes, inter alia, on education, design improvements and accountability of the
total company. Moving from there, we can espouse the same principle in adapting
supply chain security measures. Security should be imbedded into the total
organization and ensure that it is the responsibility of everybody; top to bottom or
vice versa along the supply chain. By so doing, security related breaches can be
prevented and will eventually contribute to a more cost effective preventive,
controlling and improvement aspects. This will eventually create more confidence to
the supply chain security, which will contribute greatly to the free flow of maritime
trade. Table 3 below illustrates in brief on key aspects of quality and how best can it
be fitted into the supply chain security initiatives.

Table 4: Quality and Supply Chain Security

Quality and Supply Chain Security
Quality

Security Initiatives

Defects are very costly

Security gaps create big risks

Total Quality Management

Involvement gaps of all stakeholders

Emphasis on prevention

C-TPAT, sealing and anti-tamper technologies

Source inspection

CSI and source inspection

Process control

Automated chain of custody

Identify, track, and improve quality

Container tracking and total visibility

Root cause analysis

“Quality is free”

Profiling system for shipments, shipper, carriers,
trade routes
Higher productivity with supply chain security
and confidence

Source: Lee and Wolfe
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5.3

The Win-win situation

Towards realising the “win-win situation” where security measures and trace
facilitation could be achieved hand in hand, it is feasible to also look both in the light
of maintaining quality. In security measures implementation and trade facilitation
aspects, there are two main actors who play the most important roles. They are more
often than not intersected with one another. “What do security officials actually
require from supply chain managers and vice versa”? Ideally, having those
responsible for facilitation of maritime trade thinking of security and those
responsible for security thinking about facilitation would result an improved efforts
directed at ensuring safe, orderly and efficient maritime transport. Those holding
responsibilities of both security and facilitation such as immigration, customs
authorities and the coast guards must be able to have a broad overview and must
consistently aware of both aspects; security and facilitation in addition to their
primary roles. This is where the most important perspectives come into pictures:
security measures perspective and trade facilitation and efficiency perspective. The
maritime security initiatives discussed in the previous chapter have given us idea on
what the “security managers” actually required to do; i.e. protecting the ships and
cargo being abused to facilitate the work of the terrorists. And in order to guarantee
such elements not being abused to materialise the terrorists’ ends, security managers
need to ensure that these elements are protected by undertaking the following: (a)

ensure the integrity of conveyance loading, documentation and sealing;

(b)

reduce significantly the risk of tampering in transit which also ultimately
means that the ships and crew on board need to be secured; and

(c)

Timely information about shipment; especially in this era of e-business.

The writer has also discussed in the previous chapter the need to facilitate maritime
trade. To be effective in doing so, the “supply chain managers” have to work
together with the security managers by carrying out the following:-
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(a)

committed to processing and inspecting qualifying shipments in ways that
permit highly reliable and predictable processing times for those companies
that adhere to the best security practices and standards;

(b)

protect all commercial information given to authorities; this includes
protection from Freedom-of-Information and tort disclosure;

(c)

harmonise

and

standardise

security

processes

internationally

and

domestically; and
(d)

Create security and anti-tampering practices that are by-products of
excellent supply chain processes and activities.

This will ultimately lead to better visibility and control through all supply chain
processes and activities. Security consciousness must be there at the beginning,
during and after each measure.208 These seven requirements would enable the supply
chain managers and security managers to assess the effectiveness of any supply chain
measures that being adopted in terms of effectiveness to deal with the issue of
security of supply chain and facilitation of maritime trade.

5.4

The application of technology

In the age of technological advancement, it is highly feasible to balance the need of
enhancing security and at the same times not choking the free flow of legitimate
trade. By way of example, a particularly important trade facilitation measure is the
‘Single Window’ concept209. The usage of this single window concept can generate
headway in the implementation of transport and trade facilitation initiatives while
contributing greatly in a more secure maritime business environment.
208
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Containers, which play the major part of the international maritime trade, have its
key shortfalls. Former US CBP Commissioner Robert Bonner described containers in
the following manner: “They’re as dumb as a fence post, so we just want to make
them smarter210”. The technological boom has made possible for the development
and the use of the smarter container or what usually referred to as “Smart Box”. It is
a smarter and more secure container that is, at a minimum, tamper-evident211. The
integration of Smart Box into the supply chain security and logistic will facilitate
trade in the sense that it will expedite cargo checking and clearance as it is allows
immediate but secured access. The “green lane cargo” due to its expedited checking
and clearance unquestionably will result in a significant financial and competitive
edge for exporters. As it is more secured, the Smart Box also additionally reduces
pilferage and provides more efficient and more predictable supply chain.

5.5

Learning from U.S. experience: prevention at the source

After 9/11, there are mass proliferation of supply chain security measures ranging
from the protection of cargo, ports and seafarers from becoming the victims of the
acts of terrorisms. Heightened security requirements have also led to some
suggestions, among others, to increase the inspection rate to containers from the
present 2 percent to 10 percent. It means that out of 15,000,000 containers worldwide,
1,500,000 would be subject to thorough check. In U.S. seaports alone, out of 9.5
million containers arrived (an average 26,000 a day), 950,000 or almost 2,600 a day
would need to be scrutinised212.
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Further information, see: <http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2005/nov_dec/technology.xml>
(Accessed on 20 August 2006)
211
Methods on how the concept of Smart Box are applied can be assessed at:
<http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2005/nov_dec/technology.xml> (Accessed on 20 August
2006)
212
Excerpts from the CSI Fact Sheet by the U.S. CBP dated 29 March 2006,
<http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/csi_fact_sheet.ctt/c
si_fact_sheet.doc> (Accessed on 21 August 2006)
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Looking at the first glance, this suggestion would be detrimental to trade facilitation
in general. By putting aside the cost of purchasing a container scanner machine213
and the rate of examining per container214, the scrutinising of 1,500,000 containers
would create several adverse implications or what usually expressed as the “domino
effect” 215 ; one piece falls after the other. First, there will be port and terminals
congestion, which will eventually reduce the productivity of terminal operations and
transportations expenses. Second, such inspections and congestion would slow the
flow of cargo, extension of delivery times, and decreases the reliability of shipments.
Thirdly, as awaiting inspections, there might be some cargo that has landed that may
contain WMD. It will thus offset the value of security inspections216.

In the previous discussion, the writer has highlighted the adoption of quality
consciousness into security awareness in order to gain both security benefits and
trade efficiency. As said before, if we necessitate to avoiding product flaw, we have
to ensure the quality of the product at the time it was manufactured and the same
principle applies to security of supply chain. Security measures are part of the
preventive and controlling process. Thus, take the CSI and C-TPAT for example,
both prevents and eliminates risks at its sources. We always hear a saying
“prevention is better than cure” or “nip in the bud”. This is what all security
measures such s CSI and C-TPAT is all about. If we want to eliminate inspection that
will have some serious adverse implications on the trade flow, we have to make sure
213

The USCG Port Security Assessment: Best Practices Bulletin, the initial cost of purchasing a
container scanner varies depending on type, size and model. It is estimated that the cost per container
would be at least USD2 million and the maintaining and training cost could also be considerable.
Further
information,
see:
<http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/mp/pdf/Best%20Practice%20%20Tunisia%20hundred%20percent%20xray%20screening.pdf#search='container%20screening%20cost'> (Accessed on 20 August 2006)
214
According to a Pakistan newspaper report, the rate of scanning per container would cost exporters
around USD5 for a 20feet container and USD10 for 40feet container. The report is available online at:
<http://www.dawn.com/2004/05/24/nat13.htm> (Accessed on 20 August 2006)
215
This theory was basically the U.S. foreign policy theory during the Cold War that if one land falls
into the influence of Communism, the land or country within its vicinity would also follow in domino
effect. The domino effect indicates that some change, small in itself, will cause a similar change
nearby, which then will cause another similar change, and so on in linear sequence, by analogy to a
falling row of dominoes standing on end.
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that the risk is prevented or controlled where it starts. CSI, when first being
introduced back in 2002, was not entirely welcomed by the countries because it is
said to be not entirely voluntary where if a country wanted to export to the U.S., it
must sign up. Yet, despite glaring economic problem and financial application, many
countries have signed up for CSI.

It should be further noted that containerization is the primary system of the global
trade where it has revolutionised the world’s maritime trading system. The US CBP
based on the statement of its former Commissioner Bonner, claimed that the
strategies adopted to enhance security did not only securing the supply chain against
the threat of terrorism but it also “actually facilitate the movement of trade”. How the
US experience in the enhancement of maritime security and at the same time making
sure that maritime trade is further facilitated. On that note, the main four interrelated
initiatives: the 24-Hour Rule, the NTC, the CSI and C-TPAT are investigated.
Designed to meet the goals of enhancing security and facilitation of international
maritime trade, these initiatives manipulated the usage of technology, advanced
information, extended boarder concept and public-private partnership217.

As discussed before, these maritime security initiatives such as the 24-Hour Rule
allow the CBP to obtain advance electronic information on all cargo shipped to the
US 24 hours before the cargo is loaded in foreign seaports. Then the ATS and the
NTC allow the containers to be evaluated for terrorists risk before they are loaded or
shipped to the US ports. The third initiatives i.e. the CSI, allow the CBP to identify
through automated risk targeting, and inspect high-risk containers before they are
loaded on board vessels heading to the US and finally C-TPAT which is usually
termed as public-private partnership increased the supply chain security.
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Bonner R., “From Cold War to war on terror: Security and Facilitation of Global Trade in the Post9/11 Era” – In BIMCO Review 2005, Denmark: Book Production Consultant plc, p. 174-175.
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Just as the 24-Hour Rule become effective as it promotes timeliness and accuracy218,
the need to push even further the 24-Hour becomes paramount. To achieve better
visibility along the supply chain, we can better improve the facilitation where
Advance Trade Data Initiative would be applied to get additional information. Based
on strategic alliance, the risk of terrorism would be better managed. These allow
managing the risk of terrorist by zeroing in on any suspect shipments and performing
all necessary security inspections at the earliest possible points in the supply chain.
This do not hamper the free flow of the trade as it will only target the suspected
shipment that may pose potential risk than having to check all the shipment which
will eventually cause unnecessary delays. Undoubtedly, this means fewer inspections
would be carried out and further facilitates international maritime trade.

5.6

Global maritime strategy and facilitation

Apart from that, the USCG working together with the IMO is bestowed to protect the
security of commercial ocean-going vessels and seaports all around the world via the
ISPS Code programme and these has also contributed greatly in securing maritime
trade and trading system as well as playing a significant role in achieving the overall
strategy of security and facilitation of the global trade219. It is without doubt almost a
utopia to have a single global maritime strategy. But in order to deal with global
maritime challenges, we need to go beyond our national strategy and quest to adopt a
global maritime strategy220. First of all, we have to see what we have on the table and
try to connect all these piecemeal. And only then would we be able to come out with
something workable.

218

Garcia B. R. and Prince T., “Supply Chain Manifesto” – In Containerization International
(Regional Review), September 2005, p. 5, London: T & F Informa UK Ltd.
219
Caplis J., “Global Maritime Security” – In Journal of Safety and Security at Sea: the Coast Guard
Proceedings of the Marine Safety and Security Council, vol. 63, no. 1, Spring 2006, Arlington: USCG,
2006, p. 6.
220
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As we look at the 24-Hour Rule, the CSI, C-TPAT or AIS, even these are US
creation, it still have worldwide application because as said before the U.S. is the
epicentre of world trade and those countries which wanted to trade with the U.S.
have to comply with this rule, like it or not. The WCO also plays a leading and more
active role in this effort by including the C-TPAT within its framework of standards
to facilitate and secure trade. Being represented by almost worldwide customs
administration of 169 countries which representing almost 99 percent of world trade,
WCO is seen as the best solution towards facilitation of trade and security with the
assistance of other agencies and stakeholders in supply chain. With that kind of
cooperation, security concern could make customs procedures more efficient and
effective, thus benefit trade facilitation as well221. Inherently, the launching of the
WCO Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade222 in June 2005
should be viewed as WCO 21st Century capacity building initiative 223 . The
Framework focuses on ensuring close customs-to-customs cooperation and
establishing solid customs-to-business partnership relations. It concentrates on four
main areas, specifically “the harmonization of advance electronic cargo information
requirements for inbound, outbound and transit shipments; the implementation of a
consistent risk management approach to address security threats; the definition
of benefits to businesses that meet minimal supply chain security standards and best
practice; and mandatory outbound inspection of high-risk containers upon reasonable
request by the member receiving the cargo”224.

5.7

Final remarks

Security measures and facilitation aspects of shipping are two concepts apparently
opposing to each other and the relationship between these two dichotomies have
221

UNCTAD, Trade and Transport Facilitation: Building a Secure and Efficient Environment for
Trade, TD/L.387, 17 June 2004.
222
Available online at: <http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/En/en.html> (Accessed on 21 August 2006)
223
World Customs Organization – In Port Technology International, 30th ed., summer 2006, London:
Henley Media House, p. 158.
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been extensively discussed. However, stakeholders worldwide have generally agreed
that a sound and practical balance between these two security and facilitation
requirements is indispensable. Security instruments that led to the improvement in
the security consciousness have been given considerable efficient effect on trade
facilitation. The FAL Committee of IMO, for instance, has accordingly strengthened
the convention relating to the facilitation of international maritime traffic by
amending and including new standards and recommended practices to allow for
tighter security regarding narcotics control, stowaways, illegal immigrants or
undesirable persons, piracy, procedures in ports, fraud and other safety and
emergency measures. Apart from the IMO, it is also worth mentioning that the
shipping industry has taken these problems seriously and the response is seen to be
encouraging (such as the ICS drug guide, piracy initiative and other measures)225.

Further, the active involvement of WCO in this would be supplementary to facilitate
the flow of global trade as there will be uniformity in the standards of security so that
all nations would be able to work together under the same standards to ensure the
core security standards without prejudicing the need to facilitate global trade.
Maritime security initiatives are being developed to prevent and deter any
exploitation of global terrorism. But no matter how good these measures are, it still
need to have a back-up system or what usually called as contingency plan so that
“Just-in-Case” the attack happened, the trade flow would not be a standstill for a
long times, where trade can start business with minimal disruptions 226 . In
implementing any security measures should be carried out efficiently to minimise
interference with and delay to maritime transport was emphasized.

224

UNCTAD Report, Efficient Transport and Trade Facilitation to improve Participation by
Developing Countries in International Trade, TD/B/COM.3/72, 9 January 2006, p. 12.
225
Ibid Felding, p. 2.
226
Martha J. and Subbakrishna S., “Targeting a Just-in-Case Supply Chain for the Inevitable Next
Disaster” – In Supply Chain Management Review, 1 September 2002, available online at:
<http://www.manufacturing.net/scm/article/CA243747.html?text="targeting+a+just-incase+supply+chain+for+the+inevitable+next+disaster"> (Accessed on 17 August 2006)

82

Diagram 2 below depicted that security measures been put in place to reduce the
probability of the terrorist attacks. If no measures taken, the probability of attacks to
occur would be higher and the expected cost to the society would also be high. But if
the strong terrorist measures been put in place, the expected cost to the society would
be lower. In order to decrease the possibility of terrorist attack, more resources need
to be committed227.

Diagram 2: The Cost of Terrorist Attack and anti-Terrorist Measures

Source: Kerr

“Free trade is the handmaiden to security”228. Such creation of level playing field in
trade would enhance national economic and thus will contribute constructively
towards strengthening global security regimes. The US National Security Strategy
indicates:

A strong world economy enhances our national security by advancing
prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world. Economic growth
227

Ibid Kerr, p. 5.
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supported by free trade and free markets creates new jobs and higher
incomes. It allows people to lift their lives out of property, spurs
economic and legal reform, and the fight against corruption, and it
reinforces the habit of liberty. We will promote economic growth and
economic freedom beyond America’s shores229.

228

Ibid Carafano and Nguyen, p. 4.
The White House, National Security Strategy for the United States of America, September 2002, p.
17, available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf> (Accessed on 20 August 2006)
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION: FINAL REMARKS AND WHAT MORE CAN BE DONE

“For these reasons and many others, port security and the broader
concept of maritime security cannot be reduced to a single threat vector, a
single vulnerability, a specific location, or a single unifying legal theory.
Maritime security impacts, and is impacted by, an interwoven system of
national interests, legal frameworks, economic structures, intermodal
transportation systems, and the environment. Because of that, the maritime
security equation cannot be based upon a specific threat or vulnerability. It
is more than container security, supply chain assurance, vessel borne
improvised explosive devices, waterfront facilities, or vessels”

-

Admiral Thad W. Allen

Commandant of the US Coast guard

6.1

National security v. trade: a conclusion

Article XXI – Security Exceptions of the General Agreement of Tariff and Trade230
clearly stipulated that: “Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed… (b) to
prevent any contracting party from taking any action which is necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests…(iii) taken in time of war or other
emergency in international relations;231” Looking at this angle, striking a balance
230

Typically abbreviated GATT was originally created by the Bretton Woods Conference as part of a
larger plan for economic recovery after World War II. GATT included a reduction of tariffs and other
international trade barriers and is generally considered the precursor of the World Trade Organization.
Further information on GATT is available at <http://www.wto.org/> (Accessed on 20 August 2006)
231
Full text of GATT 1947 (as amended through 1966) is available online at
<http://pacific.commerce.ubc.ca/trade/GATT.html> (Accessed on 20 August 2006)
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between maritime security and trade profitability seems to be one of the greatest
challenges in the process of globalisation. The UN views international trade
development not as an end in itself but rather as a vehicle through which economic
development and poverty alleviation may be achieved232. However, trade itself can
potentially pose threats to the good order of society and everything possible must be
done to secure the economies against such threats.

There is no single ‘silver bullet’ to deal with the issue of maritime security
effectively and efficiently. This formidable task requires deep coordination and
intense work of national agencies and international community to ensure that the
required security on the supply chain to be achieved. Those maritime security
measures, be it MTSA 2002, C-TPAT, CSI, PSI, ISPS Code or the SUA 2005 are
significant steps in the right direction to assist in reducing the vulnerability of
maritime sectors from terrorist attacks. At this particular moment, the best approach
that can be adopted is to manage those risks related to the maritime trade and to
address the issues of particular concern, such as the dichotomy between maritime
security measures and trade facilitation on a priority basis. The terrorist attacks on or
suing the supply chain could occur everywhere, and a well-planned attack could
result in significant loss of life. We must bear in mind that ‘Security must be
embedded into, not bolted upon’.

It is imperative to emphasise that the need to strengthen security within the
worldwide maritime trading system presented a unique opportunity to enhance
overall trade processes in such a way as to increase both security and trade
facilitation. Supply chain efficiency and security are distinct but interconnected and
any efforts to secure trade should try to minimise the potential negative side effects
on the economy and should also ensure that no specific country or group is excluded.
232

Terrorism is often seen as a direct result of poverty and ignorance. Some argue that it is the only
effective means for those in want to express their needs and grievances. However, such arguments
remain unsubstantiated and to some degree, simply false. In fact, a significant number of the terrorists
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6.2

What more must and can be done

Finally, it is an inherent view that those in the ports, shipping and related industries,
and even government officials, approach the security measures from a tradefacilitation point of view, rather than from a security point of view. What this means
is that many carry out their part in complying with the security measures simply
because of the need to ensure that they can carry on trading as usual, while at the
same time believing that the risks of terrorism have been exaggerated. This intrinsic
perception should be reversed in order to confront the issues of trade efficiency and
security in a more all-inclusive manner. Joseph Nye has said, “Security is like oxygen,
you tend not to notice it until you begin to lose it, but once that occurs there is
nothing else that you will think about”233. Thus, what more can or suppose to be done
by countries in finding the right balance between maritime security and the need to
facilitate maritime trade. The following six recommendations should be considered.

6.2.1

Finding the right mix

Leaders must embrace security as a strategic and necessary concept for global trade
and develop an end-to-end approach to building global trade resilience, business
models must evolve to embed security within the economics of the industry and it is
essential to establish public-private sector partnerships and interfaces that facilitate
cooperation for these security efforts. Finding the right mix will require rethinking of
business and operating models for all participants, both public and private. All
organisations must work more closely together, to be clear on where real value could
be added to the process, and also to be clear that the solutions developed were
practical, stable and can be easily implemented by the business community. The
main challenge was to facilitate the vast majority of international cargo movements
involved in major attacks over the past several years have come from those relatively wealthy
countries and upper-class families.

87

and passenger traffic as efficiently as possible while at the same time effectively
dealing with the small percentage that may pose a threat to security.

6.2.2

Rebuilt trust

Security was not a new issue and industry had been defending cargo from criminal
activities for many years. However, the threat as it is today, hailed from the trade
itself. Much of the effort that has gone into trade facilitation over the past decades
had been undone by the events of September 11th. There was now a need to rebuild
trust in the trading system and this is the responsibility of all actors in the trade
transaction chain. The need to look for equality in the approach to trade security
across all modes of transport and the pragmatic and practical solutions that are
appropriate to the threat should be emphasized.

6.2.3

Training

The world community should not respond to the political pressure to be seen to be
doing something and that the measures must also meet the needs of industry. It was
likely that security measures could cause trade distortions but that training of staff in
developing countries could help offset this. WCO should play a more distinctive role
in the security area, especially the refocusing on the need to collect export
information. A pragmatic approach to trade facilitation and security are direly needed
to avoid distortions and diversions. On that regard, WCO should devise a means to
work together with the IMO to establish an international set of principles for trade
facilitation and security.
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6.2.4

Standards among international organizations

In the trade and security area, IMO, WCO and UNCTAD could work closely
together in formulating a workable standard between these organizations.
International trade and transport facilitation were considered within UNCTAD as
tied to each other and that obstacles to transport would distort trade. Security had
long been an issue for developing countries but had now reached the multilateral
stage because it was now directly affecting developed economies. The key
experience of UNCTAD was on trade facilitation implementation and not on security
measures should be garnered further into the next level. The concept of developing a
set of core UN principles to guide the development of trade facilitation and security
initiatives for all organisations is also need to be ventured into.

6.2.5

Role of WTO

WTO should also play a more active role insofar as there were no WTO initiatives
specifically addressing trade and security issues. The need to balance the facilitation
of trade with the pursuit of legitimate control objectives is now persistent and urgent.
Essentially, there is a need to combine the requirements and synergies of trade
facilitation and security and advance information and risk management would be of
primary importance in this regard. Any new approach to trade facilitation and
security must cover other legitimate concerns, such as drugs enforcement, classical
smuggling of all sorts, money laundering etc. There was a need to focus on capacity
building and human resources development issues and finding synergies and
avoiding duplication should always be prioritised. A concise review of all maritime
security measures needs to be carried out to determine exactly who was doing what.
Unnecessary costs should be avoided and the importance to realise that trade
facilitation as an important element of economic development policy should also be
emphasised.
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6.2.6

R & D for new technologies

At present, countries have to invest millions of dollars in order to acquire sensor or
scanning technologies for detecting weapons or illegal shipments. As highlighted
before in chapter 5, the initial cost of acquiring a single scanning machine under CSI
can easily cost around USD2million. Thus, it is imperative for governments to focus
their target, apart from committing a considerable amount of fund to finance the
implementation of security measures, on the development of new technologies for
low cost yet efficient detection technologies for remote scanning of explosives and
radiation. These would provide more coordinated and valuable capabilities for better
securing of container security shipment in particular. This development of new
technologies must also take into consideration of the market requirements of the
developing countries.

6.3

Final remarks

Finally whatever the scheme that the US or the world community adopt, the aim
should be to achieve maximum security with the minimum disruption to trade. In this
ambiguous security environment, upgrading of security should be balanced as not to
unduly burden the maritime transport industry as security barriers are capable of
easily becoming trade barriers. As pointed out by the former Commandant of the
USCG, Admiral James Loy234: “To sustain prosperity, we open the gates. To ensure
security, we close gates. We clearly need to get beyond the metaphor of an opened or
closed gate.235”
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Appendix A

CSI Operational Ports – as on 29 March 2006

1.

2.

3.

In the Americas:
•

Montreal, Vancouver & Halifax, Canada

•

Santos, Brazil

•

Buenos Aires, Argentina

•

Puerto Cortes, Honduras

In Europe:
•

Rotterdam, The Netherlands

•

Bremerhaven & Hamburg, Germany

•

Antwerp and Zeebrugge, Belgium

•

Le Havre and Marseille, France

•

Gothenburg, Sweden

•

La Spezia, Genoa, Naples, Gioia Tauro, and Livorno, Italy

•

Felixstowe, Liverpool, Thamesport, Tilbury, and Southampton,
United Kingdom (U.K.)

•

Piraeus, Greece

•

Algeciras, Spain

•

Lisbon, Portugal

In Asia and the East:
•

Singapore

•

Yokohama, Tokyo, Nagoya and Kobe, Japan

•

Hong Kong

•

Pusan, South Korea

•

Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia
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4.

•

Laem Chabang, Thailand

•

Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE)

•

Shenzhen and Shanghai

•

Kaohsiung

•

Colombo, Sri Lanka

•

Port Salalah, Oman

In Africa:
•

Durban, South Africa
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Appendix B

Statement of Interdiction Principles

PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to establish a
more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of
WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and nonstate actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and
relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council. They
call on all states concerned with this threat to international peace and security to join
in similarly committing to:
1. Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for
interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and
related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation
concern. "States or non-state actors of proliferation concern" generally refers
to those countries or entities that the PSI participants involved establish
should be subject to interdiction activities because they are engaged in
proliferation through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological,
or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either
selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related
materials.
2. Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information
concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting the confidential
character of classified information provided by other states as part of this
initiative, dedicate appropriate resources and efforts to interdiction operations
and capabilities, and maximize coordination among participants in
interdiction efforts.
3. Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where
necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen when
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necessary relevant international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to
support these commitments.
4. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of
WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their national
legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations under
international law and frameworks, to include:
a. Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or
from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not to
allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so.
b. At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by
another state, to take action to board and search any vessel flying their
flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the
territorial seas of any other state, that is reasonably suspected of
transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of
proliferation concern, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.
c. To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate
circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by
other states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such
vessels that may be identified by such states.
d. To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal
waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels
that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from
states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to seize such
cargoes that are identified; and (2) to enforce conditions on vessels
entering or leaving their ports, internal waters or territorial seas that
are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as requiring
that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such
cargoes prior to entry.
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e. At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by
another state, to (a) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of
carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of
proliferation concern and that are transiting their airspace to land for
inspection and seize any such cargoes that are identified; and/or (b)
deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes transit
rights through their airspace in advance of such flights.
f. If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment
points for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state
actors of proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other
modes of transport reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, and
to seize such cargoes that are identified.
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Appendix C

FAL Convention Contracting Governments – as of 30 June 2006

Albania

Algeria

Argentina

Australia

Austria

Azerbaijan

Bahamas

Bangladesh

Barbados

Belgium

Benin

Brazil

Bulgaria

Burundi

Cameroon

Canada

Cape Verde

Chile

China

Colombia

Congo

Cote d'Ivoire

Croatia

Cuba

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Dem. People's Rep. Korea

Denmark

Dominica

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

Egypt

Estonia

Fiji

Finland

France

Gabon

Gambia

Georgia

Germany

Ghana

Greece

Guinea

Guyana

Honduras

Hungary

Iceland

India

Indonesia

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Iraq

Ireland

Israel

Italy

Japan

Jordan

Latvia

Lebanon

Liberia

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Madagascar

Mali

Malta

Marshall Islands

Mauritius

Mexico

Monaco
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Netherlands

New Zealand

Nigeria

Norway

Peru

Poland

Portugal

Republic of Korea

Romania

Russian Federation

Saint Kitts and Nevis

Saint Lucia

Samoa

Senegal

Serbia & Montenegro

Seychelles

Singapore

Slovakia

Slovenia

Spain

Sri Lanka

Suriname

Sweden

Switzerland

Syrian Arab Republic

Thailand

Tonga

Trinidad & Tobago

Tunisia

Ukraine

United Kingdom

United States

Uruguay

Vanuatu

Venezuela

Viet Nam

Zambia

Hong Kong, China

Yemen
Macau, China

(Associate Member)
Faroe Islands
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Appendix D

FAL Forms
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109

110

111

112

113

114

115

116

117
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Appendix E

Member states to World Customs Organization – as of 30 June 2006
- 169Members Afghanistan (Transitional
Islamic State of)
Albania
Algeria
Andorra
Angola
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Benin
Bermuda
Bhutan
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei Darussalam

Gambia

Nigeria

Georgia

Norway

Germany

Oman

Ghana

Pakistan

Greece

Panama

Guatemala

Papua New Guinea

Guinea

Paraguay

Guyana

Peru

Haiti

Philippines

Honduras (Republic of)

Poland

Hong Kong, China

Portugal

Hungary

Qatar

Iceland

Romania

India

Russian Federation

Indonesia

Rwanda

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Saint Lucia

Iraq

Samoa

Ireland

Saudi Arabia

Israel

Senegal

Italy

Serbia and Montenegro

Jamaica

Seychelles

Japan

Sierra Leone

Jordan

Singapore

Kazakhstan

Slovakia
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Bulgaria

Kenya

Slovenia

Burkina Faso

Korea (Republic of)

South Africa

Burundi

Kuwait

Spain

Cambodia

Kyrgyzstan

Sri Lanka

Cameroon

Latvia

Sudan

Canada

Lebanon

Swaziland

Cape Verde

Lesotho

Sweden

Central African Republic

Liberia

Switzerland

Chad

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

Syrian Arab Republic

Chile

Lithuania

Tajikistan

China

Luxembourg

Tanzania

Colombia

Macau, China

Thailand

Comoros

Madagascar

Congo (Republic of the)

Malawi

The Former Yugoslav
Republic of
Macedonia

Costa Rica

Malaysia

Timor-Leste

Côte d'Ivoire

Maldives

Togo

Croatia

Mali

Tonga

Cuba

Malta

Trinidad and Tobago

Cyprus

Mauritania

Tunisia

Czech Republic

Mauritius

Turkey

Democratic Republic of
the Congo

Mexico

Turkmenistan

Moldova

Uganda

Mongolia

Ukraine

Morocco

United Arab Emirates

Mozambique

United Kingdom

Denmark
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
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El Salvador (Republic of)

Myanmar

United States

Eritrea

Namibia

Uruguay

Estonia

Nepal

Uzbekistan

Ethiopia

Netherlands

Venezuela

Fiji Islands

Netherlands Antilles

Vietnam

Finland

New Zealand

Yemen

France

Nicaragua

Zambia

Gabon

Niger

Zimbabwe
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Appendix F

Member States of the Kyoto Convention - as of 1 August 2006

Algeria

Australia

Austria

Azerbaijan

Belgium

Botswana

Bulgaria

Canada

China

Congo (Dem.
Rep. of the)

Croatia

Cyprus

Denmark

Estonia

European
Community

Finland

Czech
Republic
France

Germany

Greece

Hungary

India

Ireland

Italy

Japan

Korea

Latvia

Lesotho

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Mongolia

Morocco

Namibia

Netherlands

New Zealand

Pakistan

Poland

Portugal

Senegal

Slovakia

Slovenia

South Africa

Spain

Sri Lanka

Sweden

Switzerland

Turkey

Uganda

United
Kingdom

United States

Zambia

Zimbabwe

Number of Contracting Parties: 50
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